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INTRODUCTION
Placebo treatments, like sugar pills and saline injections, are effective in
treating pain and perhaps a host of other conditions. In fact, recent neuroi-
maging studies show that the pathways of placebo pain relief in the brain
largely overlap the pathways of pain relief from drugs like morphine.1 Place-
bos are also cheaper and safer than corresponding active medications. To
most effectively use placebos to diagnose and treat patients in clinical prac-
tice, however, doctors must deceive patients as to the placebo nature of the
intervention. Such deception runs counter to a fifty-year trend in medical
ethics and health law that emphasizes patient autonomy and requires doc-
tors to disclose the nature of a proposed intervention in order to obtain
patients' informed consent.
The legality of deceptive placebo use has long been murky.2 This
changed to some extent in November 2006 when the American Medical
Association (AMA), the most powerful and influential organization of doc-
tors in the United States, adopted an ethics policy prohibiting the deceptive
1. See, e.g., WALTER GLANNON, BIOETHICS AND THE BRAIN 92-103 (2007); Gin-
ger A. Hoffman et al., Pain and the Placebo: What We Have Learned, 48 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. 248, 260-62 (2005); Predrag Petrovic et al., Placebo and
Opioid Analgesia-Imaging a Shared Neuronal Network, 295 ScI. 1737 (2002);
Tor D. Wager, The Neural Bases of Placebo Effects in Anticipation and Pain, 3
SEMINARS PAIN MED. 22 (2005); Tor D. Wager et al., Placebo-Induced Changes
in JMRI in the Anticipation and Experience of Pain, 303 SCI. 1162 (2004).
2. See infra Sections II.B-E.
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use of placebos.3 Because courts are likely to be influenced by the AMA
Code of Medical Ethics when evaluating norms of professional conduct,4 it
is now more likely than ever that doctors who deceptively administer place-
bos can be held liable for failing to obtain patient informed consent.' They
also risk professional discipline,6 as well as civil or criminal liability under
3. At a June 2006 meeting, the AMA's House of Delegates (the organization's
policy-setting body) considered a proposal to prohibit placebo deception put
forward by the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA). In re-
sponse, members of the House of Delegates made "lengthy vocal protests,
demanding that [CEJA] reconsider its" proposal. Peggy Peck, AMA: Ethics
Council's Stance on Placebo Therapy Stirs Unease, MEDPAGE TODAY, June 16,
2006, http://www.medpagetoday.com/PublicHealthPolicy/HealthPolicy/tb2/
3555-
In November 2006, however, the House of Delegates adopted CEJA's revised
proposal, even though its wording differed only slightly from the June 2006
version. See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Report 2-
1-06, Placebo Use in Clinical Practice (2006) [hereinafter AMA Recommenda-
tions] ("Physicians may use [a] placebo[] for diagnosis or treatment only if
the patient is informed of and agrees to its use."), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja-recs-2iO6.pdf.
CEJA also wrote a report supporting its recommendation that has not yet
been published. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Report
2-1-06, Placebo Use in Clinical Practice (2006) [hereinafter AMA Report] (on
file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
4. While the Code of Medical Ethics does not itself carry the force of law, see,
e.g., Bryant v. Hilst, 136 F.R.D. 487, 492 (D. Kan. 1991), a number of courts
have given the Code particular weight in resolving issues that turn on norms
of professional conduct in the area of informed consent, see Ketchup v. How-
ard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the AMA's Code of
Medical Ethics "reflect[s] the standard of care of the profession on the issue of
informed consent"); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ind. 1992)
("The... Code of Medical Ethics, as prepared by the Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, sets forth the medical
profession's standard on informed consent."); see also Marsingill v. O'Malley,
58 P.3d 495, 504-05 (Alaska 2002) (quoting the AMA's Code of Medical Ethics
on physician disclosure); Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 463-64
(N.J. 1999) (same).
5. See infra Sections II.B-D.
6. In many states, physicians can be sanctioned for violating the profession's
ethical standards. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-14(a) (West 2005)
(permitting the state medical board to suspend or revoke the license of physi-
cians who fail to conform to "the ethics of the medical profession, irrespective
of whether or not a patient is injured thereby"); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 677.188-
.190 (2005) (stating that physicians can be disciplined for "[u]nprofessional or
dishonorable conduct," which is defined to include "[a]ny conduct or prac-
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other theories of law.7 I will argue, contra the AMA, that given current
knowledge of placebo effects and patient preferences, we should not cate-
gorically prohibit the deceptive use of placebos.
The deceptive use of placebos by clinicians raises a number of legal is-
sues that have received surprisingly little scholarly attention! These issues
are particularly hard to resolve because there is no safe harbor for even the
most conscientious practitioners: Using placebos deceptively is thought to
threaten patient autonomy, while deliberately not using them deprives pa-
tients of a potentially cheap, safe, and effective way of treating pain and
other symptoms.9 Although there is a substantial literature on the use of
tice contrary to recognized standards of ethics of the medical or podiatric
profession"); Kenneth Baum, "To Comfort Always": Physician Participation in
Executions, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 72 (2001) (noting the statutory
incorporation of medical ethics provisions into some state medical practice
acts); see also Ben A. Rich, A Placebo for the Pain: A Medico-Legal Case Analy-
sis, 4 PAIN MED. 366 (2003) (recounting an instance in which healthcare prac-
titioners faced potential professional disciplinary proceedings for deceptively
administering placebo treatment).
7. For example, depending on the facts, doctors who prescribe placebos might
also be liable for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, or fraud. See in-
fra notes 235-246 and accompanying text. They may also face criminal liability
for battery or for selling simulated controlled substances. See infra note 236
and accompanying text. This paper focuses almost exclusively on informed
consent theories of liability because that is where the AMA focuses its con-
cerns and because informed consent theories of liability are now likely to pro-
vide sufficient, though not exclusive, grounds for finding doctors liable.
8. I have found only two articles in the legal literature that focus specifically on
the use of placebos in clinical practice. See Kathleen M. Boozang, The Thera-
peutic Placebo: The Case for Patient Deception, 54 FLA. L. REV. 687 (2002);
Marshall B. Kapp, Placebo Therapy and the Law: Prescribe with Care, 8 AM. J.L.
& MED. 371, 375 (1983). The issue also receives some attention in W. John
Thomas, Informed Consent, the Placebo Effect, and the Revenge of Thomas Per-
cival, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 313, 346-47 (2001). I have found only one article in the
medical literature that explores the legal issues in any depth. See Rich, supra
note 6.
9. A number of books about the placebo effect contain discussions of ethical
issues raised by placebo use. See HOWARD BRODY, PLACEBOS AND THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF MEDICINE: CLINICAL, CONCEPTUAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES (1980);
DANIEL E. MOERMAN, MEANING, MEDICINE, AND THE "PLACEBO EFFECT"
(2002); THE PLACEBO EFFECT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ExPLORATION (Anne
Harrington ed., 1997); PLACEBO: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND MECHANISMS
(Leonard White et al. eds., 1985); THE SCIENCE OF THE PLACEBO: TOWARD AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH AGENDA (Harry A. Guess et al. eds., 2002);
ARTHUR K. SHAPIRO & ELAINE SHAPIRO, THE POWERFUL PLACEBO: FROM
ANCIENT PRIEST TO MODERN PHYSICIAN (1997); W. GRANT THOMPSON, THE
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placebos in medical experiments,1" research subjects are almost always in-
formed that they may receive placebos. Such research does not involve de-
ception. By contrast, in the clinical context, patients are rarely told that they
are receiving placebos because doing so would reduce the therapeutic value
of the proposed treatment."
If doctors were to actually abide by the AMA prohibition on deceptive
placebo use, the policy would dramatically affect medical practice. Decep-
tive placebo use-described as one of medicine's "dirty little secrets"" 2-
probably occurs more often than one would expect. Some placebos, like
sugar pills or saline injections, are given to patients even though they con-
tain no active ingredients at all. A study at a Canadian teaching hospital
from the early 198Os found that 80% of doctors and nurses had administered
placebos, consisting more than nine times out of ten of sterile water injec-
tions.' 3 The study estimated that about 240 patients at the hospital each year
were given inert substances as treatments. 4 More recent research from
other countries suggests that placebos, in one form or another, are still fre-
quently prescribed. 5
While doctors occasionally give patients pure placebos like sugar pills
and saline injections, they far more frequently prescribe ordinary, active
pharmaceuticals for conditions that are not pharmacologically treated by
the prescribed drugs. For example, doctors sometimes prescribe antibiotics
PLACEBO EFFECT & HEALTH: COMBINING SCIENCE & COMPASSIONATE CARE
(2005).
10. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffiman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible
Research or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449 (2001); Kenneth J.
Rothman & Karin B. Michels, The Continuing Unethical Use of Placebo Con-
trols, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 394 (1994).
11. See infra Subsection II.A.i.
12. E-mail from Paul Arnstein, Assoc. Professor of Cmty. Health, Boston Coll., to
Adam J. Kolber (July 20, 2006, o8:21:38 EDT) (on file with the Yale Law & Pol-
icy Review).
13. Gerald Gray & Patrick Flynn, A Survey of Placebo Use in a General Hospital, 3
GEN. Hosp. PSYCHIATRY 199, 200-01 (1981).
14. Id. at 200.
15. I provide an in-depth analysis of existing survey data on placebo use in the
United States and elsewhere in Section II.B. By way of anecdotal data, Paul
Arnstein states that at a recent "national conference, we asked by a show of
hands how many nurses had seen an order for placebos written[.] Just about
all of the 150 in attendance raised their hand. When asked how many had ad-
ministered placebos, about 8o% had." E-mail from Paul Arnstein, Assoc. Pro-
fessor, Comty. Health, Boston Coll., to Adam J. Kolber (July 20, 2006, o8:21:38
EDT) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
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or vitamins in order to generate placebo effects.' 6 In such cases, the antibi-
otic or vitamin is deemed an "impure placebo." The use of impure placebos
can be difficult to detect because the prescribed medication has a pharma-
cological effect on some illnesses, and doctors may be able to provide plausi-
ble-sounding medical rationales for prescribing impure placebos. The pre-
scription of impure placebos is arguably more suspect than the prescription
of pure placebos because the practice is harder to detect and because it car-
ries the greater risk of patient side effects that are frequently associated with
active medications. In the case of antibiotics, for example, overprescription
threatens everyone's ability to resist bacterial infections. 7 The AMA Code of
Medical Ethics now prohibits deceptive administration of both pure and
impure placebos.
In the past, researchers estimated that "35 to 45 percent of all prescrip-
tions are for substances that are incapable of having an effect on the condi-
tion for which they are prescribed."' 8 While these numbers do not necessar-
ily reflect instances of deceptive placebo administration, more recent data
suggest that deceptive placebos, in one form or another, are still a common
feature of medical practice. 9 In this Article, I describe the legal and ethical
issues raised by deceptive placebos and argue against categorical prohibi-
tions on their use like the one adopted by the AMA. Deceptive placebos
have genuine therapeutic benefits, and the AMA should not have prohibited
them without more evidence that they are harmful. Too little is known
about the science of placebos, as well as the sociology of patient preferences,
to warrant a categorical prohibition at this time.
In Part I, I provide background on what placebos are, how they are
thought to work, and the extent to which they hold promise as a therapy in
clinical settings. In Part II, I describe why deception is needed to maximize
placebo efficacy and why such deception raises questions about the legality
of deceptive placebo administration. While there are no published opinions
16. See Rebecca K. Schwartz et al., Physician Motivations for Nonscientific Drug
Prescribing, 28 Soc. Sci. & MED. 577, 577-79 (1989) (surveying doctors with
suspicious prescribing practices and observing that 24% of this group admit-
ted to intentionally prescribing antibiotics or other active drugs in order to
obtain placebo effects).
17. See Jeffrey A. Linder et al., Antibiotic Treatment of Children with Sore Throat,
294 JAMA 2315, 2321 (2005) (providing evidence of antibiotic overprescription
and noting the risk of bacterial resistance).
18. Sissela Bok, The Ethics of Giving Placebos, 231 Sci. AM. 17, 18 (1974) (reviewing
the literature); cf. Laura Spinney, Purveyors of Mystery, NEW SCIENTIST, Dec.
16-22, 2006, at 42 (quoting Dr. Patrick Lemoine as stating that the "most reli-
able estimates suggest that around 35 to 40 per cent of all official prescriptions
are impure placebos").
19. See infra Section II.B.
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in which a doctor has been found liable for deceptively administering a pla-
cebo, deceptive placebo administration arguably violates doctors' legal obli-
gations to obtain patient informed consent. While there are reasons to think
placebo deception might have violated these obligations even before the new
AMA provision, I will suggest that there used to be plausible arguments in
both directions. By weighing in on the matter, the AMA's provision may
well have tipped the scales against the practice of placebo deception.
In Part III, I explain why the AMA's categorical prohibition of deceptive
placebos was ill advised. First, prohibition is inconsistent with the prefer-
ences of many patients. Given that many patients seem willing to receive
placebos deceptively, arguments that deceptive placebos threaten patient
autonomy ought not to be accepted uncritically. Second, the categorical
prohibition is overinclusive because it prohibits a great deal of behavior that
we think ought to be permissible, such as deceptive placebo use that is safe-
guarded to promote patient well-being. Third, a categorical prohibition like
the AMA's may have unintended consequences by, for example, dictating
informed consent requirements for birth control pills, which typically in-
clude a week of placebos as part of a monthly pill-taking regimen. Fourth, a
categorical prohibition on deceptive placebo use provides incentives to doc-
tors who would have prescribed pure placebos to prescribe impure placebos
instead, because the latter practice is more difficult to detect. By encourag-
ing doctors to prescribe impure placebos, not only are patients still de-
ceived, they also have a greater risk of harmful side effects and must pay for
more expensive treatment.
Lastly, I argue that the concern over placebo administration mistakenly
focuses too much on the harms of deception in individual cases. The more
salient concern is that placebo deception is a scarce medical resource. The
more frequently that doctors deceive patients, the more that patients be-
come aware of the practice of placebo deception and the weaker the placebo
effect becomes. The best reason to limit placebo use is that placebos must be
administered sparingly, else their power will be self-defeating, particularly in
a world where patients have greater access to medical information and have
become increasingly savvy about their own medical treatment. But even if
deceptive placebos should only be used sparingly, it is by no means clear
that a categorical prohibition is required to accomplish that goal.
In Part IV, I discuss the near absence of court cases challenging decep-
tive placebo administration and explain why this fact should give us pause
before we prohibit the practice. I also propose an interdisciplinary research
agenda that would enable us to develop more targeted policies about when
and how to regulate placebo deception. As I believe that further evidence
could potentially justify a categorical prohibition on deceptive placebos, my
defense of clinical placebo deception is quite limited. I end by noting that
the issues raised by deceptive placebo use are just a small part of a much
bigger debate concerning beneficent deception in general.
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I. BACKGROUND
Placebo deception raises interesting legal and ethical issues only if there
are, in fact, placebo effects that are sufficiently beneficial to justify patient
deception. In this Part, I describe the placebo effect, the AMA's ban on de-
ceptive placebos, and evidence that placebos can generate substantial im-
provements in some patient conditions.
A. The Meaning of "Placebo" and "Placebo Effect"
It is difficult to precisely define the term "placebo."2° According to the
definition adopted by the AMA, a placebo is "a substance provided to a
patient that the physician believes has no specific pharmacological effect
upon the condition being treated."21 Under this description, physicians may
believe that a placebo treatment is quite therapeutic, provided they do not
believe it to have a "specific" effect on the condition for which they pre-
scribe it. Thus, the AMA's definition shifts the difficult definitional issues
from the word "placebo" to the word "specific."
Non-specific effects of placebos include the changes placebos cause by
way of the patient's expectations of feeling better, selective attention to
symptoms, and conditioned responses to treatment.22 While these effects
likely have quite specific neurological mechanisms, the AMA probably
deems them "non-specific" because they do not proceed through the kind
of pharmacological pathways that physicians and drug companies typically
seek to use to heal patients.23 A 1997 publication of the National Institutes of
Health avoids the language of "specific efficacy," stating that the placebo
effect is the "positive healing effect resulting from the use of any healing
20. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 18 (identifying eighteen different dictionary en-
tries for the word "placebo" from 1785 to 2001); Boozang, supra note 8, at 692-
99 (discussing competing definitions of the term).
21. AMA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at i.
22. Donald D. Price & Howard L. Fields, The Contribution of Desire and Expecta-
tion to Placebo Analgesia: Implications for New Research Strategies, in THE
PLACEBO EFFECT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION, supra note 9, at 117.
23. Walter Brown states that a non-specific effect "probably refers, among other
things, to an imprecise or undefined mode of action or an effect on more than
one condition." Walter A. Brown, Placebo as a Treatment for Depression, io
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 265, 266 (1994); see also Richard R. Bootzin &
Opher Caspi, Explanatory Mechanisms for Placebo Effects: Cognition, Personal-
ity and Social Learning, in THE SCIENCE OF THE PLACEBO, supra note 9, at io8,
no-n (stating that "[a]lthough the placebo effect stems from incidental ele-
ments of treatments, the effects of the placebo can be highly specific" (foot-
note omitted)); Boozang, supra note 8, at 698 nn.58-59 (reviewing various de-
finitions of "specific" efficacy).
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intervention ... that is presumed to be mediated by the symbolic effect of
the intervention upon the patient." 4 Of course, this description still forces
us to confront what it means for a treatment to be mediated by a symbolic
effect.
In some cases, patient placation may be, or may appear to be, a kind of
placebo effect. Suppose that a patient begs his doctor to prescribe an antibi-
otic, and the doctor does so, even though the doctor believes the patient to
have a viral infection that will not respond to antibiotics. Under the AMA
definition, the doctor has prescribed a placebo, assuming that the doctor
believes that the antibiotic will have no specific effect on the patient's condi-
tion. Yet what if the only effect of the placebo is to make the patient less
anxious? Is the patient's reduced anxiety a placebo effect or just a conse-
quence of patient placation? We may be hesitant to deem his anxiety reduc-
tion a placebo effect because we do not ordinarily think of anxiety as a
symptom of viral infections. On the other hand, were this patient to go to a
psychiatrist for treatment of anxiety, we would likely deem the same anxiety
reduction from a placebo to be a placebo effect. If the patient's overall con-
dition improves, the distinction may be unimportant.
Notably, the AMA's definition of placebo limits its scope to "sub-
stance[s]" provided to patients. Most researchers construe placebos more
broadly to include medical procedures, like sham surgery, where an inter-
vention makes a person feel better, if at all, only through a placebo effect.25
Some also deem certain features of the doctor-patient relationship to have
placebo-like qualities (e.g., a doctor's confidence-inducing white coat, fancy
diploma, and reassuring attention), even though these features are not con-
sidered treatments at all in the conventional sense.26
There is an interesting flip side to the placebo effect, called the "nocebo
effect." The nocebo effect refers to "the causation of sickness (or death) by
expectations of sickness (or death) and by associated emotional states. "27
24. OFFICE OF ALTERNATIVE MED., NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 4 COMPLEMENTARY
& ALTERNATIVE MED. NIH 3 (1997); see also Bootzin & Caspi, supra note 23, at
lo9 (citing the NIH publication).
25. For example, Arthur and Elaine Shapiro use the term "placebo" to refer to
"any therapy prescribed knowingly or unknowingly... for its therapeutic ef-
fect on a symptom or a disease, but which actually is ineffective or not specifi-
cally effective for the symptom or disorder being treated." Arthur K. Shapiro
& Elaine Shapiro, The Placebo: Is It Much Ado About Nothing?, in THE PLA-
CEBO EFFECT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION, supra note 9, at 12.
26. See Bootzin & Caspi, supra note 23, at lo9; Boozang, supra note 8, at 720 (de-
scribing the view of "meaning model" adherents).
27. Robert A. Hahn, The Nocebo Phenomenon: Scope and Foundations, in THE
PLACEBO EFFECT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION, supra note 9, at 56;
see also Sissela Bok, Ethical Issues in Use of Placebo in Medical Practice and
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When patients believe they are receiving a treatment with a certain negative
effect, the effect is more likely to eventuate. 28 For example, "80 percent of
hospitalized patients given sugar water and told that it was an emetic [a
substance that induces vomiting] subsequently vomited."29
Some determine whether or not a treatment is a placebo by objectively
examining the effects of the treatment on a patient. 30 Others identify place-
bos by assessing the placebo administrator's subjective intent to use a treat-
ment to obtain a placebo effect. The AMA adopts the latter approach, focus-
ing on whether a physician believes a substance to have specific effects on a
patient's condition. 31 To illustrate the difference, consider the time before it
was known that aspirin reduces the risk of a heart attack. Suppose a doctor
then prescribed aspirin for a cardiac patient solely in the hopes of generating
a placebo effect. Under these circumstances, the doctor prescribed a placebo
according to the AMA definition because the physician believed (albeit in-
correctly) that aspirin would have no specific pharmacological effect on the
patient's condition. By contrast, this would not have been an instance of
placebo administration from an objective perspective, because the aspirin
really would have had specific effects on the patient's condition.
As noted in the Introduction, certain placebos, like sugar pills or saline
injections, are pure placebos, which means that they have no pharmacologi-
cal or other specific effects on the body (or, at least, that they are not in-
Clinical Trials, in THE SCIENCE OF THE PLACEBO, supra note 9, at 53, 58 (not-
ing that the term "nocebo effect" is used by some "to designate undesirable
side effects of a placebic treatment that are not intended by the caregiver who
is providing it in the hope of its bringing about positive effects; others limit
the term to conditions where the subject expects a negative outcome, as in the
extreme case of 'voodoo death"').
28. Irving Kirsch, Specifying Nonspecifics: Psychological Mechanisms of Placebo
Effects, in THE PLACEBO EFFECT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION, supra
note 9, at 166, 176; see also Thomas R. Weihrauch, Placebo Treatment Is Effec-
tive Differently in Different Diseases-But Is It Also Harmless?: A Brief Synopsis,
10 Sci. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 151, 152 (2004) (noting that, in controlled re-
search studies, the side effects of those taking placebos are often similar to the
side effects of those receiving the experimental treatment).
29. Hahn, supra note 27, at 57.
30. For example, Arthur and Elaine Shapiro focus on a treatment's actual effects
on the body regardless of whether the placebo effect is sought "knowingly or
unknowingly." Shapiro & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 12; see also Boozang, supra
note 8, at 696-97 ("Significant to [Arthur] Shapiro's definition is an objective
determination of whether something is a placebo; the physician's intent or be-
lief being irrelevant .... " (footnote omitted)).
31. AMA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at i.
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tended to have specific effects).32 By contrast, impure placebos are ordinary
pharmaceuticals or other treatments that have specific effects on some
medical conditions but no specific effects on the condition for which they
are administered (or, at least, that they are not intended to have specific
effects on that condition). 33 For example, a doctor convinced that his pa-
tient has a viral infection who nevertheless gives the patient an antibiotic to
treat the infection has administered an impure placebo because antibiotics
do not ordinarily treat viral infections. The distinction between pure and
impure placebos is not very robust, for even sugar pills will have specific,
pharmacological effects on blood sugar in a diabetic.34
B. Anecdotal Benefits and Harms of Placebos
Anecdotal accounts of deceptive placebo administration illuminate both
potential benefits and potential perils of placebo deception. For example,
Patrick Lemoine, a French psychiatrist and author of Le Mystre du Pla-
cebo,35 notes that magnesium is often prescribed for anxiety in Europe in
order to obtain a placebo effect.36 Magnesium has no specific pharmacologi-
cal effect on anxiety, although "[r]are conditions resulting from a deficiency
of magnesium produce some symptoms very similar to those of anxiety.' 37
Lemoine "confess[es]" that he prescribes magnesium to patients with high
levels of anxiety, noting that his "patients are generally satisfied."3" More-
over, he sometimes has "the impression that not only do they show a re-
markable improvement, but their relapse is almost immediate if the treat-
ment is interrupted."39 So long as Lemoine believes that magnesium has no
specific pharmacological effect on anxiety, as seems to be the case,
Lemoine's use of magnesium to treat anxiety would fall under the AMA's
definition of a placebo.4"
32. See SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that placebos can be "inert
(such as a sugar pill) or active (such as an ineffective drug or a drug used at an
ineffective dosage)").
33. Id.
34. Bootzin & Caspi, supra note 23, at 113.
35. PATRICK LEMOINE, LE MYSTiRE DU PLACEBO (2d ed. 2006).
36. Laura Spinney, Purveyors of Mystery, NEW SCIENTIST, Dec. 16, 2006, at 42
(interviewing Patrick Lemoine).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Remarkable accounts of placebo improvement have even been reported for
sham surgery (which, not being a "substance," is technically not addressed by
the AMA prohibition). A New York Times article in 2000 tells the story of Syl-
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By contrast, doctors sometimes deceptively give placebos to patients
that they perceive as too persistent in seeking medical attention or as faking
symptoms. Such deception can be quite harmful. Sissela Bok recounts the
following story of deceptive placebo administration gone frighteningly awry:
"I didn't know there could be pain so great," a man once wrote me
from prison. He had repeatedly complained to the staff physician of
strong pain in his left kidney area and had tried to explain that the
shots prescribed for his pain had brought no relief. When he tried
once again to ask for help, the physician, who said he was in a hurry
to go home for the evening, prescribed yet another injection. "I
looked to see what medication he ordered and it was water." The
prisoner's protests and mounting distress finally convinced those in
charge to send him to a hospital. He was found to have an unusually
painful kidney stone and was given immediate care and pain relief.
"But to realize that the doctor was prescribing water for this will al-
ways leave a memory," he wrote, "and I don't think I would ever
trust a doctor again.
41
vester Colligan, a seventy-six-year-old veteran who had knee trouble for the
preceding five years. His doctor suggested that he might have arthritis and re-
ferred him to J. Bruce Moseley, a surgeon who is also the team physician for
the Houston Rockets professional basketball franchise. Moseley conducted a
pilot study to test the efficacy of arthroscopic knee surgery by comparing
those who had the surgery (where the knee joint is scraped and rinsed) to
those who had a sham version of the surgery (where sedatives are adminis-
tered and knee incisions are made so it later seems to the patient as if ordinary
surgery occurred). Colligan, who had only the sham treatment, could not
have been happier with the results:
"I was very impressed with [Moseley], especially when I heard he was
the team doctor with the Rockets," says Colligan .... Colligan
doesn't sound all that at ease with the term placebo, but he does
know his surgery consisted of only shallow incisions. More impor-
tant, he knows that he has no pain in his knee now and that he can
mow his yard again and walk wherever he wants. "The surgery was
two years ago and the knee never has bothered me since," he says.
"It's just like my other knee now. I give a whole lot of credit to Dr.
Moseley. Whenever I see him on the TV during a basketball game, I
call the wife in and say, 'Hey, there's the doctor that fixed my knee!"'
Margaret Talbot, The Placebo Prescription, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, § 6 (Mag-
azine), at 35-36. While Colligan was not deceived about the placebo nature of
the surgery, the New York Times account suggests that his understanding of
the procedure was incomplete. Yet, if the sham treatment was the cause of his
improvement, we should not entirely discount its therapeutic value.
41. Bok, supra note 27, at 57.
26 : 75 2007
A LIMITED DEFENSE OF CLINICAL PLACEBO DECEPTION
Mike Woods, a veteran of the Persian Gulf War, tells a similar story
about his own experiences with concealed placebos. In 1991, Woods re-
turned from the Gulf exhibiting symptoms that he associates with his mili-
tary service, including seizures, headaches, and memory lapses. 42 As part of
his treatment, a doctor in the Department of Veterans Affairs health system
gave him a prescription for an inactive substance called "obecalp," which is
"placebo" spelled backwards.43 In 2005 congressional testimony, Woods
claimed that this experience provides additional evidence that the govern-
ment has not taken seriously post-Gulf War illnesses.44
C. Placebo Efficacy
The placebo effect has purportedly "been demonstrated in thousands of
studies."45 One of the most influential was Henry K. Beecher's 1955 article in
the Journal of the American Medical Association, which claimed that, on av-
erage, more than 35% of patients are "satisfactorily relieved by a placebo." 46
Looking at fifteen studies with a total of more than one thousand subjects, 7
he claimed to find powerful evidence of placebo effects in the treatment of
conditions that involve subjective responses, including post-operative
42. Michael McLeod, After the Storm: The Persian Gulf War: lo Years Later, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 20Ol, at Ai.
43. Gulf War Veteran Gets Placebos Instead of Real Medicine, WSOCTV.coM, Feb.
23, 2006, http://www.wsoctv.com/specialreports/7373238/detail.html. The pre-
scription of "obecalp" was also the subject of an episode of the television show
ER. See ER: Shifts Happen (NBC television broadcast Oct. 23, 2003); see also
ER Headquarters, Shifts Happen, http://www.erheadquarters.com/episodes/
lO/lO2o5.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2007) (describing the episode).
44. Examining VA Implementation of the Persian Gulf War Veterans Act of 1998:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on National Security, Emerging Threats, and In-
ternational Relations of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, lo4th Cong. 144
(2005) (statement of Mike Woods); see also Claire Panosian Dunavan, A Pla-
cebo, Yes, But Not Harmless, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at F6 (stating that in
the 1970s, "a few doctors at my university hospital treated patients with saline
injections and little blue sugar pills," sometimes writing "obecalp" on patient
prescriptions). An anesthesiologist has described the extensive use of decep-
tive placebos at a medical center associated with a major research institution
during the time he spent there as a medical intern from 1974 to 1975. See Be-
hindTheMedspeak: Obecalp, bookooe.com, http://www.bookoloe.com/2004/
11/behindthemedspe_3.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
45. Howard Spiro, Clinical Reflections on the Placebo Phenomenon, in THE PLA-
CEBO EFFECT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION, supra note 9, at 37, 40.
46. Henry K. Beecher, The Powerful Placebo, 159 JAMA 1602, 1604-05 (1955).
47. Id. at 1604, tbl.2.
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wound pain, cough, mood, angina, headache, seasickness, anxiety, and the
common cold.4"
Unfortunately, Beecher's influential study was also quite flawed and
likely overstated the magnitude of what we typically call placebo effects.49
Most significantly, Beecher's study failed to adequately recognize that most
ailments improve over time, quite independent of the placebo effect.5° Thus,
even if 35% of patients improved their condition while taking a placebo,
some substantial percentage would have improved over time without it.
Beecher gave the placebo effect too much credit by failing to discount the
effect of natural healing over time.51
To better assess the placebo effect, we should compare those taking pla-
cebos to a group receiving no treatment at all. Indeed, in a 2001 issue of the
New England Journal of Medicine, two Danish researchers, Asbjorn Hr6b-
jartsson and Peter C. Gotzsche, published a meta-analysis of 114 medical
experiments where a "no treatment" group was included. 2 They found that
most previous studies could not distinguish the beneficial effects of placebos
in clinical trials from natural healing over time and from regression to the
mean.53 The researchers claimed to find "little evidence that placebos in
48. Id. at 1604-05.
49. This point is most clearly made in Gunver S. Kienle & Helmut Kiene, The
Powerful Placebo Effect: Fact or Fiction?, 50 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1311,
1316 (1997).
50. Bootzin & Caspi, supra note 23, at 112.
51. Beecher's study also failed to account for certain statistical effects that are
likely to arise in research studies. For example, if patients in these studies are
more likely to enroll "when their pain is at or near its greatest intensity, then
the statistical phenomenon of regression to the mean predicts that their pain
level is likely to be lower when they return for a second pain assessment."
Hoffman et al., supra note 1, at 251. Furthermore, patients in clinical studies,
perhaps by virtue of incentives to please investigators, may consciously or un-
consciously report more severe symptoms at the beginning of a study and less
severe symptoms at the end. See Bootzin & Caspi, supra note 23, at 113. Doing
so would overstate the effect of both experimental and placebo therapies
(though not necessarily to the same degree).
52. Asbjorn Hr6bjartsson & Peter C. Gotzsche, Is the Placebo Powerless?: An Anal-
ysis of Clinical Trials Comparing Placebo with No Treatment, 344 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1594, 1595 (2001).
53. Id. at 1594.
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general have powerful clinical effects,"54 though they did find significant
placebo effects related to pain reduction. 5
The Hr6bjartsson and Gotzsche study has itself been criticized on a va-
riety of methodological grounds.56 Importantly, the study examined placebo
effects in medical experiments, where subjects are aware that they may or
may not be receiving placebos. In the clinical context, placebo effects are
likely to be stronger because patients are led to believe that they are receiv-
ing an active medication. Nevertheless, the Danish study is likely correct
that the scope of the placebo effect is smaller than many have claimed, as is
the range of symptoms that can be treated effectively with placebos.
In any event, the Danish researchers did find significant placebo effects
in the treatment of pain, which is consistent with other experiments demon-
strating placebo analgesia. For example, a 1984 study in Nature found that
the deceptive administration of placebos had about the same pain-relieving
effect as the hidden administration of eight milligrams of morphine.57 In
fact, when placebos are prescribed in clinical contexts, they are frequently
prescribed for pain relief. One study reported that approximately 90% of
the pure placebos administered at a Canadian teaching hospital were given
to treat pain and its associated symptoms. 5 8 Furthermore, in those cases
where placebos were used, head nurses reported success with the first ad-
ministration in eight of ten cases, and approximately half of patients con-
tinued to have a placebo response after more than three administrations. 9
There is also a growing body of neuroscientific evidence supporting the
view that placebos can generate substantial pain relief that is much like the
pain relief from conventional analgesics. As noted, a number of brain imag-
ing studies suggest that the pathways of placebo pain relief in the brain
54. Id. at 1599; see also Kienle & Kiene, supra note 49, at 1316 ("[W]e have not
found any reliable demonstration of the existence of placebo effects.").
55. Hr6bjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note 52, at 1597, 1599.
56. See, e.g., Irving Kirsch, Yes, There Is a Placebo Effect, But Is There a Powerful
Antidepressant Drug Effect?, 5 PREVENTION & TREATMENT 22 (2002); Penelope
J. Greene et al., The Powerful Placebo: Doubting the Doubters, 17 ADVANCES IN
MIND-BODY MED. 298, 302 (2001) (citing methodological concerns related to
study selection, publication bias, general concerns about meta-analysis in this
context, and the ways in which the researchers selected outcome measures)
David Spiegel et al., Is the Placebo Powerless?, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1276
(2001).
57. Jon D. Levine & Newton C. Gordon, Influence of the Method of Drug Admini-
stration on Analgesic Response, 312 NATURE 755, 755 (1984).
58. Gray & Flynn, supra note 13, at 201.
59. Id. at 201-02.
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largely overlap with the pathways of pain relief from standard opioids.6 °
This research supports older studies which found that naloxone, a drug that
blocks opioid analgesia, also blocks placebo analgesia. 61 Thus, neuroscience
research supports the view that placebos reduce the subjective distress of
pain and that placebo relief is, perhaps needless to say, real relief.
The analgesic value of placebos seems to derive in large measure from
the expectations of relief they create.62 If pain is a signaling mechanism that
tells us when our bodies need rest or attention, then the expectation that our
bodies will get better quite possibly reduces the intensity of those signals.63
In addition, placebos may generate conditioned responses that "arise after
an individual is repeatedly exposed to pairings of neutral sensory cues (the
shape of a pill, the environment of a doctor's office) with effective treatment
manipulations."' We therefore have both strong empirical data demon-
strating placebo effects along with plausible theories that explain placebo
efficacy.
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that deceptive placebos can
assist in patient diagnosis. For example, in Subsection III.C.i, I will describe
how placebos can help distinguish seizures associated with epilepsy, a neu-
rological disorder, from the attacks associated with psychoseizures, a psy-
chological disorder. Interestingly, those who doubt the diagnostic value of
placebos sometimes emphasize the powerful efficacy of placebos in a wide
swath of patients. They claim that because people respond to placebos under
so many conditions, placebos cannot be used to make differential diagno-
ses.65 For example, one article notes:
[A] placebo response (that is, relief of pain) tells nothing about the
origin of pain. The placebo is a powerful tool for pain control in
susceptible persons, regardless of the origin of the pain.... Thus
malingerers or drug addicts do not have a greater likelihood of be-
ing relieved by a placebo. Indeed the impression given by most of
60. See supra note 1.
61. Hoffman et al., supra note 1, at 258-59.
62. Id. at 257.
63. See NICHOLAS HUMPHREY, Great Expectations: The Evolutionary Psychology of
Faith-Healing and the Placebo Effect, in THE MIND MADE FLESH: ESSAYS FROM
THE FRONTIERS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND EVOLUTION 255, 273-74 (2002).
64. Hoffman et al., supra note 1, at 257.
65. Jeffrey T. Berger, Placebo Medication Use in Patient Care: A Survey of Medical
Interns, 170 WEST J. MED. 93, 94 (1999) (suggesting that placebos are "use-
less. .. in assessing a complaint of pain"); James S. Goodwin et al., Knowledge
and Use of Placebos by House Officers and Nurses, 91 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
106, 109 (1979).
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the studies is that such patients are less likely to be placebo re-
sponders.66
The fact that patients can be relieved by placebos under a variety of cir-
cumstances, however, does not preclude the possibility that placebos can aid
in diagnosis. In fact, the very suggestion that malingerers and drug addicts
may have a weaker response to placebos is evidence that placebos may have
diagnostic value. If there are consistent differences in the magnitude of pla-
cebo response that correlate with diagnosis, then placebos can potentially
reveal information pertinent to diagnosis.
In any event, the AMA's explanation for its new policy never denies the
efficacy or diagnostic value of placebos. Rather, the AMA is concerned with
the legal and ethical implications of using a treatment that requires patient
deception. Thus, in order to examine the relevant legal and ethical issues,
for the rest of this Article we may safely assume the truth of the prevailing
view that there are clinically significant placebo effects, particularly for pain
and possibly for other symptoms or conditions as well.
D. Placebo Deception
The AMA now permits placebo use only when "the patient is informed
of and agrees to its use."67 So, the AMA clearly prohibits outright lies about
the nature of a placebo treatment. For example, it violates the AMA rule to
give patients sugar pills and tell them that they are receiving Valium. I be-
lieve that the AMA requirement more broadly prohibits certain omissions
and half-truths where doctors exploit informational asymmetries between
doctor and patient to help generate a placebo effect.6" So, suppose that a
doctor gives a patient unmarked sugar pills and says, "A number of research
studies suggest that these pills can help your pain." While the doctor has not
uttered any factually false statements, assuming the patient accepts the pills
under the conventional understanding that they contain active medication,
the patient has nevertheless been deceived. In such cases, it would be incor-
rect to say that the patient was "informed of" and "agrees to" use the pla-
cebo, as the AMA requires."
66. See Goodwin et al., supra note 65, at 109.
67. AMA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 1.
68. See generally Frederick Schauer & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Paltering (John F.
Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Working Paper No. RWPo7-oo6, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=832634 (discussing the le-
gal status of "paltering," a term used to refer to "intentionally deceptive prac-
tices such as fudging, twisting, shading, bending, stretching, slanting, exagger-
ating, distorting, whitewashing, and selective reporting").
69. It would seem odd if the AMA were concerned about patient autonomy in a
way that permitted statements about placebos that were factually true but
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Filling in the precise contours of our background conventions concern-
ing treatment disclosure turns out to be quite difficult. Even when doctors
deliberately withhold knowledge from patients in order to capitalize on
placebo effects, they are not necessarily deceiving them. Treatments exist on
a spectrum ranging from those expected to create only a placebo effect to
those for which the placebo effect is entirely irrelevant to the decision to
prescribe. In many cases, treatments are prescribed for mixed reasons, in-
cluding hopes of both specific and placebo effects. Suppose drug Z might
have some pharmacological effect on a patient, but the probability is too low
to justify the drug's possible side effects. The benefits of prescribing Z might
exceed the costs, however, given both the chance of a pharmacological effect
and the chance of a placebo effect.
In such a case, the placebo effect is treatment determinative. It is an es-
sential part of the doctor's decision to prescribe the treatment. Deliberately
failing to mention the placebo purpose of the treatment when the doctor
would mention mechanisms of non-placebo relief might brush up against
the borders of deception. The doctor would be concealing the placebo effect
in order to bolster it. Most likely, however, our background conventions do
not require disclosure in such cases. It would be rare indeed and probably ill
advised for a doctor to say, "Take this medication. It may or may not help
your cough directly, but, in any event, it will put you at ease and may divert
your attention from your symptoms by way of a placebo effect." Such a
discussion would undermine the very placebo effect that motivated the
treatment. In any event, the AMA sidesteps some of the difficult questions
about our background conventions by focusing on those cases where the
placebo effect is the sole medical reason for prescription.
Finally, I will focus on situations that involve "therapeutic deception,"
meaning situations where a physician deceives a patient, believing that do-
ing so is in the patient's best interest. By contrast, placebos can also be used
to overcharge patients, to dispatch with troublesome or time-consuming
patients, and to provide a patient with a short-term remedy at the expense
of a more careful and thorough diagnosis and treatment regimen. There is
no doubt that deceptive placebos, like any treatment, can be used for the
wrong patient at the wrong time. In order to evaluate the AMA's categorical
prohibition, however, it is important to determine whether deceptive place-
bos can ever be used at the right time.
II. DECEPTION AND THE LAW OF INFORMED CONSENT
Honesty was not considered an essential part of the healer-patient rela-
tionship until the second half of the twentieth century. In fact, the Code of
Ethics of the American Medical Association in 1847 stated that doctors have
nevertheless deceptive. If, however, the AMA would permit such statements,
then the scope of its ban is smaller than I take it to be in this Article.
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a sacred duty "to avoid all things which have a tendency to discourage the
patient and to depress his spirits,"7 and it was not until the 1980s that the
AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics required doctors to "deal honestly with
patients and colleagues."
Over the last fifty years or so, lawyers and bioethicists have increasingly
emphasized the obligation of healthcare practitioners to respect the
autonomous decisions of competent patients by obtaining their informed
consent prior to treatment. Informed consent is said to be "perhaps the
oldest and most basic legal implementation of bioethical principles."7 2 Ac-
cording to the doctrine of informed consent, practitioners are required to
make certain disclosures to patients prior to beginning medical procedures
and to obtain the patient's permission to proceed.73 The right is "in part...
a safeguard against being manipulated by caregivers who may be less than
altruistic, less than competent in evaluating patients"74 and may also be "in
part a safeguard against health professionals engaging in deceit, no matter
how benevolent in intent."75
70. Bok, supra note 27, at 56 (quoting AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS ch. I, art.
I, para. 4 (1847)).
71. AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS princ. 11 (198o); Bok, supra
note 27, at 55. Note that this language has since been updated. AM. MED.
AsS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS princ. II (2001), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html ("A physician shall...
be honest in all professional interactions, and strive to report physicians defi-
cient in character or competence, or engaging in fraud or deception, to ap-
propriate entities.").
72. Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411, 417 (2006);
see also id. at 411-44 (arguing that the concept of autonomy perversely domi-
nates contemporary bioethics).
73. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Schloendorffv.
Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent.., is liable in damages."); Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed
Consent: To Inform or Not To Inform?, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 543 (1997) (de-
scribing the law of informed consent in New York State).
74. Bok, supra note 27, at 56.
75. Id. The New York Court of Appeals has held that doctors' obligations to speak
truthfully in regard to doctor-patient matters are so important that the obli-
gation can extend to doctors' communications with third parties, such as an
insurance company. Aufrichtig v. Lowell, 650 N.E.2d 401, 404 (N.Y. 1995)
("[W] e conclude that because the... treating physician stands in a relation-
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Howard Spiro has stated that "[t]he autonomy movement of the 196os,
built on the foundation of truth-telling, gave the quietus to placebos as it led
to a general derision of the old-fashioned beneficent 'deception' that place-
bos seem to represent. "76 What was once general derision, however, has now
turned into clear civil liability. For some time, many hospitals and profes-
sional organizations have prohibited the deceptive use of placebos.77 The
new AMA provision, however, is particularly likely to make deceptive pla-
cebo use unlawful because some courts take the "Code of Medical Ethics, as
prepared by... the American Medical Association, [to set] forth the medi-
cal profession's standard on informed consent."78
In this Part, I discuss placebo deception and why it is necessary to de-
ceive patients in order to maximize placebo efficacy. I then show that, prior
to the AMA's change to its ethics policy, it was not clear whether deceptive
placebo administration would violate the doctrine of informed consent. In
fact, to the best of my knowledge, no published cases have discussed the
matter. Because there are no relevant precedents, courts are particularly
likely to give weight to the AMA's new provision. Thus, it is now more likely
than ever that doctors who deceptively use placebos not only violate the
Code but also invite legal liability and professional disciplinary actions.
A. Avoiding Deception
Before examining whether deceptive placebos necessarily violate obliga-
tions of informed consent, I address the suggestion that patients can still get
the benefits of placebos without deception if doctors procure patients' in-
ship of confidence and trust to his patient, he owed plaintiffs in this case a
duty to speak the truth about her medical condition.").
76. Spiro, supra note 45, at 39.
77. For hospital prohibitions on deceptive placebos, see, for example, ORLANDO
REG'L HEALTHCARE, ETHICAL USE OF PLACEBOS (2005),
http://www.ashp.org/emplibrary/Useofplacebopolicy.pdf (prohibiting decep-
tive placebo administration). For health professional organization prohibi-
tions, see, for example, Mark Sullivan et al., APS Position Statement on the Use
of Placebos in Pain Management, 6 J. PAIN 215 (2005); Am. Soc'y of Health-
System Pharmacists, ASHP Policy Position: Ethics,
http://www.ashp.org/s-ashp/docc.asp?CID=512&DID=7320#0517; and CAN-
DICE C. COGGINS ET AL., AM. Soc'Y FOR PAIN MGMT. NURSING, POSITION
STATEMENT ON USE OF PLACEBOS IN PAIN MANAGEMENT (2004),
http://www.aspmn.org/pdfs/Use%2ooP/o2oPlacebos.pdf.
78. Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E. 2d 98, 103 (Ind. 1992); see Ketchup v. How-
ard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the AMA's Code of
Ethics "reflect[s] the standard of care of the profession on the issue of in-
formed consent"); see also supra note 4.
26 : 75 2007
A LIMITED DEFENSE OF CLINICAL PLACEBO DECEPTION
formed consent to placebo treatment.79 According to the AMA, doctors can
reveal to patients in advance the placebo nature of their treatments without
"significantly diminish[ing] their clinical effectiveness,"8 thereby only using
placebos "in partnership with" patients."' Furthermore, in the AMA's view
"[p]hysicians can avoid using a placebo, yet produce a placebo-like effect
through the skillful use of reassurance and encouragement." 2 While I sup-
port research into both of these claims, I argue that concealed placebos al-
most certainly work better than revealed placebos. Supportive physician-
patient relationships ought to be encouraged, but it is unlikely that such
support obviates the need for prudent placebo deception.
i. Revealed Placebos
A number of researchers have suggested that patients can still get the
benefits of pure placebos even when doctors reveal their inert nature. 3 This
claim is ostensibly bolstered by a 1965 research study by Lee Park and Lino
Covi in which fifteen adult "neurotic" outpatients were prescribed pure
placebos for one week and were told exactly what they were receiving. 4
Each subject was told that "[m] any people with your kind of condition have
also been helped by what are sometimes called 'sugar pills,' and we feel that
a so-called sugar pill may help you, too."8 5 To make the point even clearer,
researchers stated that "[a] sugar pill is a pill with no medicine in it at all. I
think this pill will help you as it has helped so many others. 8 s6
One might expect that patients would be neither willing to participate in
such an experiment nor capable of experiencing a beneficial placebo effect
given what they were told. Surprisingly, however, fourteen of the fifteen
subjects proceeded with the course of treatment, and only one did not be-
cause "her husband ridiculed and verbally attacked her for wasting her
79. See Boozang, supra note 8, at 720-24; Kapp, supra note 8, at 390-94.
80. AMA REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 3. Presumably, the term "skillful" would not extend to deceptive uses of
reassurance.
83. See Boozang, supra note 8, at 720-24; Kapp, supra note 8, at 390-94.
84. Lee C. Park & Lino Covi, Nonblind Placebo Trial, 12 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIA-
TRY 336, 336-37 (1965).
85. Id. at 337.
86. Id.
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money on 'sugar pills."' 8 7 Perhaps even more surprisingly, thirteen of the
fourteen subjects improved, some of them quite significantly.8 8
The Park and Covi study was, however, a short, small-scale experiment
that did not account for the natural course of symptom improvement and
has not been subsequently replicated.89 Furthermore, an astonishing six of
the fourteen patients told researchers that they believed they were receiving
an active drug, even though they were explicitly told the contrary.9" Thus, it
is not clear that the Park and Covi subjects truly believed that they were
receiving placebos. In an interesting case of deceptive jujitsu, one subject
"felt that perhaps the doctor had told him he was receiving placebo so that
he would think that he was helping himself, when actually the drug was the
factor."9 1
On the other hand, some subjects gave glimpses of how a non-deceptive
placebo could be therapeutic, with one reporting that "[elvery time I took a
pill I thought of my doctor and how I'm doing."9 2 The placebo reminded
the patient of his own efforts to change himself for the better, a response
loosely suggestive of the "conditioning hypothesis" mentioned earlier.9 3 If
one consciously or unconsciously associates a pill with healing, the pill
could plausibly still have a therapeutic effect even after the nature of the
placebo is revealed.
In a controversial journal article, psychiatrist Walter Brown suggested
that doctors can use revealed placebos as a treatment for depression.94 Cit-
ing placebo responses ranging from 30% to 50% of depressed patients, he
recommended four to six weeks of non-deceptive placebos as an initial
treatment for a "sizable portion" of depressed patients.95 To avoid concerns
about informed consent, Brown recommended that doctors reveal the pla-
cebo nature of the treatment in a conversation similar to the one used by
Park and Covi:
Mrs. Jones, the type of depression you have has been treated in the
past with either antidepressant medicine or psychotherapy, one of
87. Id. at 337-38, 342.
88. Id. at 338.
89. See Donald F. Klein, Identified Placebo Treatment?, io NEUROPSYCHOPHAR-
MACOLOGY 271 (1994).
90. Park & Covi, supra note 84, at 341.
91. Id. at 339.
92. Id. at 342.
93. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
94. Brown, supra note 23, at 265.
95. Id. at 265.
26 : 75 2007
A LIMITED DEFENSE OF CLINICAL PLACEBO DECEPTION
the talking therapies. These two treatments are still widely used and
are options for you. There is a third kind of treatment, less expen-
sive for you and less likely to cause side effects, which also helps
many people with your condition. This treatment involves taking
one of these pills twice a day and coming to our office every two
weeks to let us know how you're doing. These pills do not contain
any drug. We don't know exactly how they work; they may trigger
or stimulate the body's own healing processes. We do know that
your chances of improving with this treatment are quite good. If af-
ter six weeks of this treatment you're not feeling better we can try
one of the other treatments.96
Brown's suggestion was met with a great deal of skepticism, as some re-
searchers thought he relied too heavily on the flawed Park and Covi study.97
The bottom line, however, is that while the work of Brown and of Park and
Covi deserves further examination, there is little reason to think that re-
vealed placebos are as effective as concealed placebos. Indeed, common
sense and some experimental research suggest that deceptive placebos will
be more effective than revealed placebos, as deception creates an expecta-
tion of healing that is difficult to generate with revealed placebos.
In one study, all subjects were given a placebo, in the form of decaffein-
ated coffee, to drink.9" However, some subjects were deceptively told that it
was caffeinated coffee, while others were told that it was either caffeinated
coffee or decaffeinated coffee but that they would not be told which type of
coffee it was. Subjects in the first group really believed that they were drink-
ing caffeinated coffee and so did their bodies. The pulse rate of people in
that group increased from drinking decaffeinated coffee, while the pulse rate
of people in the group that was uncertain about the nature of its coffee did
not.9 9
96. Id. at 267.
97. See David L. Dunner, Commentary on "Placebo as a Treatment for Depression,"
1O NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 273 (1994); Ellen Frank, Commentary on
"Placebo as a Treatment for Depression," io NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 275
(1994); Klein, supra note 89; A. John Rush, Placebo Responsiveness Does Not
Imply That Placebo Is a Sufficient Treatment, io NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOL-
OGY 281 (1994); M. Tracie Shea, Commentary on "Placebo as a Treatment for
Depression," lo NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 285 (1994). Brown replies to
his critics in Walter A. Brown, Reply to Commentaries, lo NEUROPSYCHO-
PHARMACOLOGY 287 (1994).
98. Irving Kirsch & Lynne J. Weixel, Double-Blind Versus Deceptive Administra-
tion of Placebo, 102 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 319,319 (1988).
99. Id. at 319, 322; see also Franklin G. Miller et al., Deception in Research on the
Placebo Effect, 2 PLoS MED. 0853, 0853 (2005) (citing literature for the propo-
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Furthermore, clinician reports indicate that deceptive placebo admini-
stration ceases to work once the nature of the treatment is revealed.°' Thus,
even if revealed placebos can be effective therapy, unless they are as effective
as deceptive therapy, we will lose some of the therapeutic value of deception.
So long as deceptive placebos are more effective than revealed placebos, we
cannot entirely avoid the legal and ethical issues raised by therapeutic de-
ception.
2. Written Waivers and April Fool's Deception
Another method sometimes thought to eliminate deception is to ask pa-
tients to waive their informed consent rights. More specifically, patients
could be asked in advance to consent to deceptive placebos should they ever
become suitable candidates for such treatment. 10' For example, we could
add disclaimers to general consent forms or to hospital admission forms
that warn patients that placebos may sometimes be used in treatment. Do-
ing so may be an effective way to reduce the amount of deception associated
with placebo administration while still maintaining a placebo effect. It may
also reduce health professionals' legal liability. 
102
As noted, however, placebo effects rely heavily on expectations.0 3 If I
expect a pill to improve my condition, the pill is more likely to do so. I have
the strongest expectation that a placebo will heal me if I am deceptively told
that the placebo is an active medication proven to help my condition. By
warning people in advance that they may receive placebos, the waiver re-
places deception about the placebo nature of treatment with uncertainty.
Waivers put patients into an epistemic position more like that of a research
subject who does not know whether he is receiving active treatments or
placebos. Placebos do seem to have some effect on subjects in research ex-
periments, and so they are likely to have some effect on patients who know-
sition that "across a wide range of clinical conditions[,] altering expectancies
for improvement has an impact on therapeutic outcomes").
100. Gray & Flynn, supra note 13, at 201 (reporting results from the early 198os of
interviews with thirty-five head nurses at Victoria General Hospital about de-
ceptive placebo administration).
101. Boozang, supra note 8, at 692, 737-38; Kapp, supra note 8, at 403-05.
102. On informed consent waivers generally, see FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW
§ 6-15, at 335-36 (2d ed. 2000). See also Stover v. Ass'n of Thoracic & Cardio-
vascular Surgeons, 635 A.2d 1047, 1055-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (finding insuf-
ficient evidence that the plaintiff-patient waived her right to informed con-
sent disclosure).
103. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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ingly waive objections to concealed placebos."°4 Yet, those who sign advance
waivers are less likely to obtain positive effects from placebos because they
will be less likely to believe that they are receiving a medication with specific
effects on their symptoms.
Creating expectations using uncertainty rather than deception has sev-
eral other downsides. First, waivers followed by secretive placebo admini-
stration are still somewhat deceptive. They present a form of deception that
I call April Fool's deception. Almost everyone in the United States is aware
of the tradition of pulling pranks on others on April 1, yet somehow millions
of people are tricked each year. Even if I consent in October to be tricked six
months later, I may still be deceived when the trap is actually sprung. Just
like an April Fool, those who sign informed consent waivers may still be
deceived upon discovering that they are receiving placebos. Granted, they
may not be wrongfully deceived. Assuming that your April Fool's prank falls
within the scope of my consent in October, I likely do not have grounds to
complain that your deception was wrongful. Nevertheless, even advance
waivers do not necessarily eliminate negative feelings that ensue from de-
ception.
Second, and more disconcertingly, advance waivers may jeopardize
some of the benefits of ordinary, active medications. Even when a doctor
prescribes an active medication for a patient's symptoms, the patient may
experience a placebo effect that supplements whatever effect the active
medication has. Patients who sign advance waivers may be less likely to
experience placebo effects from active therapies because they will have rea-
son to suspect that even their active medications may really be placebos.
Thus, a disadvantage of warning people in advance about deceptive placebos
is that doing so can reasonably be expected to diminish the healing power of
whatever treatments they are given.
Until more research is done on placebo disclosure waivers, most of what
we can say about them is speculative. It seems likely, however, that they fail
to maximize placebo effects. Furthermore, even if such waivers offer the best
method of balancing interests in candor and interests in reducing suffering,
until hospitals and other healthcare organizations take action to implement
such waivers, individual practitioners may still be confronted with legal and
ethical quandaries concerning deceptive placebo administration.
3. Placebo-Like Effects in the Doctor-Patient Relationship
The AMA and other commentators have also argued against placebo
deception by claiming that much of the benefit from placebos comes from
the nature of the doctor-patient relationship itself-from, for example, the
time, energy, and attention of a person trained to heal others. Thus, they
104. Hr6bjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note 52 (acknowledging that placebos do
have an effect on certain measures of pain in research studies).
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suggest, rather than seeking a quick-fix through placebo prescription, we
should more directly embrace and foster the placebo-like effects inherent in
the doctor-patient relationship. 105
There is much wisdom underlying this suggestion. No doubt, a great
deal of anxiety has been relieved by a comforting conversation with a physi-
cian, whether or not the patient receives a prescription or other treatment.
There are three reasons, however, to doubt that such interactions can en-
tirely supplant deceptive placebo use. First, I assume that advocates of this
position are seeking an honest doctor-patient interaction. This means that
there are limits on the amount of reassurance a physician can give; other-
wise, we have simply traded one form of deception for another. Second,
there are fundamental differences between having a positive, honest doctor-
patient interaction and receiving a placebo treatment that one thinks will
relieve symptoms. It is doubtful that both of these approaches treat the same
sort of problems and do so to the same extent. Lastly, while it would im-
prove the quality of care if doctors would spend more time with patients,
listen carefully to their complaints, demonstrate that they understand and
empathize with patient concerns, and so forth, these activities cost time and
money. Given current demands on healthcare resources, the recommenda-
tion that doctors should spend more quality time with patients cannot be
fully endorsed unless we know how the change will be funded and whether
other patients will be left untreated or undertreated because resources have
been diverted to increase doctor-patient face and phone time.
B. Materiality of Disclosure
Given that we cannot obtain all of the therapeutic benefits of placebos
without deception, those concerned about liability must look more closely
at whether such deception violates the legal doctrine of informed consent.
Under the doctrine, doctors are "not... required to disclose every aspect of
[a] proposed treatment or procedure or to discuss every possible risk in-
volved."' °6 According to Prosser and Keeton, disclosures are supposed to
include "the nature of the pertinent ailment or condition, the risks of the
proposed treatment or procedure, and the risks of any alternative methods
of treatment, including the risks of failing to undergo any treatment at
all."10
7
105. See generally HOWARD BRODY WITH DARALYN BRODY, THE PLACEBO RE-
SPONSE: How You CAN RELEASE THE BODY'S INNER PHARMACY FOR BETTER
HEALTH 226-43, 249 (2000) (suggesting that doctors can non-deceptively help
patients generate placebo-like effects with support and reassurance).
106. Mitchell v. Kayem, 54 S.W.3d 775, 780 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
107. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 190
(5th ed. 1984).
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The list of required disclosures should also include doctors' obligation
to disclose the "nature and purpose of [a] proposed treatment.' ' 0 8 In cases
of deceptive pure placebos, practitioners cannot, by definition, fully reveal
the nature of a proposed intervention and still administer a deceptive pla-
cebo. In cases of impure placebo administration, a practitioner might be
able to reveal, in some sense, the nature of the treatment (e.g., this pill is an
antibiotic) but cannot deceptively treat the patient while fully revealing the
purpose of the treatment (e.g., to relieve patient suffering though a placebo
effect). Under either form of placebo deception, doctors can still make
many truthful disclosures, often including the nature of the patient's diag-
nosis, the risks of the treatment, the risks of alternative treatments, and the
risks of not undergoing any treatment at all.
1. Reasonable Physician Standard
When patients sue practitioners for negligently failing to disclose in-
formation, states apply one of two standards to measure the adequacy of
physician disclosure. The more traditional standard used in about half of
U.S. jurisdictions measures the adequacy of a doctor's disclosure against the
disclosure that would have been made by a reasonable doctor in the situa-
tion that confronted the defendant-doctor.0 9 Thus, "[i]n most cases, the
questions of whether and to what extent a physician has a duty to disclose a
particular risk are to be determined by expert testimony which establishes
the prevailing standard of practice""0 and whether or not the physician
departed from it." '
Ordinarily, one of the best ways to understand prevailing clinical prac-
tices is to examine survey data. Unfortunately, we have little data on placebo
practices in the United States. Published surveys are either outdated, limited
to doctors who are still completing their training, or both. Surveys from
other industrialized countries, however, may give us some sense of what we
108. FURROW ET AL., supra note 102, § 6-ii(b), at 315; see also Natanson v. Kline,
350 P.2d 1093, 11o6 (Kan. 196o) (noting a duty to disclose "the nature of the
proposed treatment").
109. FURROW ET AL., supra note 102, § 6-1o(a), at 313-14; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-
548 (2005); Robinson v. Bleicher, 559 N.W.2d 473 (Neb. 1997); Mitchell, 54
S.W.3d at 779-80 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (2000)); see also Jaime
Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case
for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. LAW & MED. 429, 437 (2006).
110. Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690, 695 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
111. See, e.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965) ("[Issues of proper
disclosure in informed consent cases] are not matters of common knowledge
or within the experience of laymen. Expert medical evidence thereon is just as
necessary as is such testimony on the correctness of the handling in cases in-
volving surgery or treatment."); Hook, 316 S.E.2d at 695.
101
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might find upon further research. These surveys suggest that placebo use in
the clinical context is rather widespread. Unfortunately, the surveys vary
significantly in the scope of treatments they deem to be placebos-some
include both impure and pure placebos and some include only pure place-
bos-making it difficult to compare results over time or between countries.
Importantly, the survey research may understate actual usage, as virtually all
of the research on clinical placebos relies on self-reported data, 12 and doc-
tors may be hesitant to report, even on anonymous surveys, that they engage
in a practice fraught with legal and ethical concerns.
a. Placebo Usage Outside the United States
A 2004 survey of 89 Israeli doctors and head nurses found that 6o%
admitted giving patients a placebo and only 5% thought placebos should be
categorically prohibited." 3 Among those who treated patients with placebos,
62% used them frequently, 14 with 94% finding them either generally effec-
tive (33%) or occasionally effective (61%)." The placebos administered by
Israeli doctors included pure placebos like "saline infusions or intramuscu-
lar injections," "sugar or artificial sweetener pills[,] or prepared placebo
tablets,"" 6 as well as impure placebos like acetaminophen (the active ingre-
dient in Tylenol) or vitamin C when these substances were given in place of
the "ordinarily prescribed medication.""' 7 Among the placebo administra-
112. One notable exception was a 1979 study in the United States that examined
five hospital wards for six months and found that five of nineteen hundred
inpatients received placebos. Goodwin et al., supra note 65, at 1o8. Presuma-
bly, the study examined the use of pure placebos, as it would have been very
difficult to identify the use of impure placebos.
113. Uriel Nitzan & Pesach Lichtenberg, Questionnaire Survey on Use of Placebo,
329 BMJ 944, 944-45 (2004). The survey included (1) doctors working in hos-
pital inpatient and outpatient settings, (2) family physicians in community
clinics, and (3) head nurses working in the same hospital inpatient settings as
the doctors in group (1). Id. at 944. The English translation of this survey,
which is available at http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/data/bmj.38236.646678
.55/DCi/i, does not make clear whether "placebo" is meant to refer to both
pure and impure placebos or to pure placebos alone. Perhaps some partici-
pants adopted the narrower definition, leading the researchers to underesti-
mate total usage.
114. Nitzan & Lichtenberg, supra note 113, at 944-45 (stating that 62% of those
admitting to placebo use said they did so "as often as once a month or
more").
115. Id. at945.
116. Id.
117. Id. (noting also that placebos were administered both as a diagnostic tool and
to treat a wide variety of conditions, including "anxiety, pain (including ab-
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tors, only 4% told patients that they were receiving placebos." 8 Eleven per-
cent told patients that they were receiving non-specific medicine," 9 while
68% told patients that they were receiving "real medicine."' 20
A 2003 survey in Denmark asked doctors how often they prescribe or
administer a variety of treatments where "the effect of the pharmacological
or specific content of the treatments was expected to be negligible."'' Un-
der this wide definition that incorporates both pure and impure placebos,
"86% of general practitioners, 54% of hospital doctors, and 41% of private
specialists" reported administering placebos at least once in the preceding
year, 2 2 with 48% of the general practitioners reporting that they had used
placebos more than ten times in the preceding year.1 23 The placebo inter-
ventions used by general practitioners included antibiotics (70%), physio-
therapy (59%), sedatives (45%), B vitamins (48%), and saline injections
(5%).124 Forty-six percent of the surveyed physicians considered placebo use
ethical, while 40% thought it unethical. 25 Interestingly, of those who found
placebo use unethical, 5o% reported that they had nevertheless prescribed
placebos. 1
26
If practices in the United States resemble those of Israel and Denmark,
then, putting aside the new AMA provisions, a good case could be made
that deceptive placebo use does not fall below the standard of care, such that
disclosure is not required by the reasonable physician. In Israel and Den-
mark, deceptive placebo use is not uncommon, although a sizeable minority
of Danish doctors consider the practice unethical. On the other hand, part
of what makes rates of deceptive placebo use seem relatively high in these
surveys is that they include both pure and impure placebos. Were a court
presented with a case in which a doctor deceptively administered a pure
dominal), agitation, vertigo, sleep problems, asthma, contractions in labour,
withdrawal from recreational drugs, and angina pectoris").
118. Id. (noting also that 17% reported that they told patients nothing about the
nature of the drug administered).
119. Id.
120. Id. The term "real medicine" seems ambiguous, however, particularly in the
case of impure placebos.
121. Asbjorn Hr6bjartsson & Michael Norup, The Use of Placebo Interventions in
Medical Practice-A National Questionnaire Survey of Danish Clinicians, 26
EVALUATION & HEALTH PROPS. 153, 156 (2003).
122. Id. at 157.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 158.
125. Id. at 159.
126. Id. at 16o.
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placebo, much could turn on whether the court were to treat the use of pure
and impure placebos as different practices; the use of impure placebos is
quite common while the use of pure placebos is probably not.
b. Placebo Usage in the United States
We have some data on doctors' pure placebo usage in the United
States-at least among doctors still completing their training-from a 1979
survey that examined the placebo practices of interns, residents, and nurses
at a U.S. teaching hospital. 27 The surveyed doctors used placebos about
once or twice per year during their postgraduate training. 18 Of the 6o phy-
sicians and 39 nurses surveyed, 78% of the physicians and 82% of the nurses
had ordered or administered "at least one placebo medication for relief of
pain, with the median number of instances being four to seven for both
groups."' 29 The survey revealed several cases where placebos were used to
dispatch difficult patients or to test whether patients were faking symp-
toms. 130
A more recent and, hence, more relevant survey involved 74 interns at a
university-affiliated community hospital in Long Island, New York. This
survey, conducted in 1999, was also limited to pure placebos. 3' Sixty-four
percent of the interns were aware that pure placebos are sometimes used in
clinical practice, and 16% of those interns had ordered placebo administra-
tion during their internships.'32 Attending physicians knew that interns had
ordered pure placebos in half of the instances in which it occurred, and
none of them objected to it.'33 The 1979 and 1999 surveys of doctors-in-
training examined different populations with different questions, but these
surveys may offer limited evidence that the deceptive use of pure placebos
declined among young doctors in the United States over a twenty-year pe-
riod.
The survey data from the United States are particularly limited in value
because they rely on self-reports of young doctors who may be the most
reluctant group of doctors to use a therapy considered suspicious. Neverthe-
127. Goodwin et al., supra note 65, at 1O6-1o. The physicians included "house offi-
cers" in internal medicine, family practice, psychiatry, and obstet-
rics/gynecology. See id. Based on the survey context and usage at the time, I
take "house officers" to refer primarily to interns and residents.
128. Id. at io8.
129. Id. at 107.
130. Id. at 107-10.
131. Berger, supra note 65, at 93-94.
132. Id. at 94.
133. Id.
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less, if courts were to look only at pure placebo use in the United States, they
might indeed find the practice on the wane. Restricting an examination of
placebo use to pure placebos would probably be mistaken, however. As
ethicists and lawyers have increasingly emphasized the importance of in-
formed consent over the last fifty years, it is likely that patients who would
have been treated in the past with pure placebos are now treated with im-
pure placebos. Although this shift makes doctor deception harder to dis-
cover, it subjects patients to higher rates of side effects from active medica-
tions. If courts were to designate pure placebo use as below the prevailing
standard of care while impure placebo use continued unabated, it is not at
all clear that courts would have promoted patients' interests.
In any event, the doctrine of informed consent might take a wrong turn
in the deceptive placebo context were it to rely on prevailing physician prac-
tices. Many doctors likely avoid using placebos, regardless of their potential
diagnostic or therapeutic value, for fear that placebo deception is illegal or
unethical (or may be viewed by others as such). Thus, examining doctors'
actual practices with respect to placebo use may not provide a reliable indi-
cation of their beliefs about its diagnostic or therapeutic value. Further-
more, while doctors clearly have a comparative advantage in assessing the
therapeutic value of a treatment, decisions to use or refrain from using de-
ceptive placebos go beyond such judgments.'34 It is by no means clear that
doctors are better equipped to decide the underlying legal and ethical issues
than anyone else,' 35 nor is it clear that the unelected members of the medical
profession ought to have the political authority to do so.' 36
Whether or not doctors ought to have such authority, the AMA effec-
tively has considerable power to set the standard of care for placebo use.
Now that the AMA has made it an ethical violation to use deceptive place-
bos, the AMA's provision will likely serve as powerful evidence that decep-
tive placebo use falls below the professional standard of physician con-
duct.'37
134. See Robert M. Veatch, Abandoning Informed Consent, 25 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 5 (1995) (recognizing that knowledge of what is medically best for a pa-
tient does not imply knowledge of what will best promote the patient's overall
well-being).
135. Cf Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Respect for the
patient's right of self-determination ... demands a standard set by law for
physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon
themselves.").
136. Indeed, it is generally thought that twentieth-century health professionals
were too insensitive to the need for informed consent. If they can err with too
little disclosure, it seems plausible that they can err with too much.
137. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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2. Reasonable Patient Standard
In about half of U.S. jurisdictions, materiality of disclosure is deter-
mined by a "reasonable patient" standard rather than a reasonable physician
standard. 3 The reasonable patient standard was most famously explicated
in Canterbury v. Spence.' In Canterbury, the D.C. Circuit stated that a doc-
tor must reveal the risks associated with an intervention "when a reasonable
person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's
position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks
in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy."' 4 ° According to
the court, "on the basis of his medical training and experience," a doctor
should be able to foresee "how the average, reasonable patient expectably
would react.'' 4 Courts using the reasonable patient standard allow the fact-
finder to determine what "a reasonable person would find material" as
"technical expertise is not required."'
The concern about deceptive placebo use is less about disclosing patient
risk from placebos and more about disclosing the nature or purpose of the
treatment in question. Presumably, the information required to be disclosed
is the information that a reasonable patient would want to know, although
this is not entirely clear. For example, in Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance
Company,143 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin described its standard, at one
point in the opinion, as "extend[ing] to the information a reasonable pa-
tient would need to know in order to make an informed decision.' 14 4 Later
in that same paragraph, however, the court stated that "the touchstone of
the test was what the reasonable person in the position of the patient would
want to know."' 45
In the deceptive placebo context, these conditions are quite different. In
order to make an informed decision about medical treatment, almost by
definition, a patient needs to know what substance he is receiving. On the
138. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772; Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145 (Alaska
1993); Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995).
139. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
140. Id. at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Con-
sent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)).
141. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
142. FURROW ET AL., supra note 102, § 6-1o(b), at 314; see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d
at 778 (explaining that the materiality issue "is for the finder of the facts" to
determine).
143. Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. 1999).
144. Id. at 30 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
145. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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other hand, it is not at all clear that a reasonable patient would want to
know that he is receiving a placebo in cases in which a deceptive placebo
would be, consent issues aside, the best available therapy but knowledge of
the placebo's nature would eviscerate its effectiveness.1 46 The language of
this case is, thus, ambiguous as to whether deceptive placebo use violates
informed consent requirements more or less by definition or whether the
requirements do not extend to information that a reasonable patient would
not want to know because the information is itself inconsistent with the
patient's therapy. 147
To get some sense of how a factfinder might assess deceptive placebo
use under a reasonable patient standard, we can turn to the very limited
survey data available on patient placebo preferences. A 1993 survey in Swe-
den explored both doctor and patient attitudes toward placebo use and
provides a rare opportunity to compare these perspectives. Surprisingly, the
survey showed patients to be much more placebo-friendly than doctors.
When asked if "physicians ought to give patients placebos on their own
initiative more often," 25% of patients agreed either completely (5%) or for
the most part (20%). Among the doctors, however, only 7% agreed for the
most part, and none agreed completely.
48
The survey also presented respondents with some hypothetical scenar-
ios. The first concerned a patient who complains to his doctor about a cold
and a cough and requests penicillin to get better quickly. After examining
the patient, the physician finds "no medical grounds for prescribing penicil-
lin," but the patient is insistent and so the doctor writes him a prescription
for it.'49 Respondents were asked to express agreement or disagreement with
several statements, including one that asked whether the doctor should have
given the patient pure placebos rather than active medication. 5 ° Almost half
146. Indeed, Kathleen Boozang argues that, assuming there are significant placebo
effects, a reasonable patient would not want to know that he is being given a
placebo. Boozang, supra note 8, at 739.
147. Furthermore, not unlike what occurs under the reasonable physician stan-
dard, reasonable patients may also be influenced by what they take to be the
relevant legal and ethical norms associated with placebo administration.
Thus, the patients' bill of rights displayed in a doctor's waiting room may not
only reflect interests patients independently care about, it may expand those
interests as well.
148. Niels Lynoe et al., The Attitudes of Patients and Physicians Towards Placebo
Treatment-A Comparative Study, 36 Soc. Sci. & MED. 767, 771 (1993).
149. Id. at 769.
150. The published research refers to these pure placebos as "lactose pills," a term
which could be confusing to laypeople. The author of the study has con-
firmed, however, that the Swedish version of the survey used a term closer to
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(48%) of the patients agreed either completely (20%) or for the most part
(28%) that the doctor should have employed a pure placebo. By contrast,
only 1i% of the physicians agreed either completely (2%) or for the most
part (9%) that a pure placebo should have been used.' 5 '
The results of the second case study provide even more surprising evi-
dence about the extent of patient support for deceptive placebo use. This
case study concerned a forty-two-year-old woman dying of untreatable
cancer who nevertheless "still has great hopes of being cured by treat-
ment." 52 "In order not to dash her hopes and make her remaining time
unbearable, she receives placebo treatment which the physician in general
terms maintains is a form of cancer treatment."'53 Respondents were pre-
sented with the following statement: "The procedure is acceptable if the risk
is small that the patient discovers that she received placebos."' 54 Well more
than half (63%) of the patients agreed either completely (35%) or for the
most part (28%). By contrast, only 9% of the physicians agreed either com-
pletely (2%) or for the most part (7%).155
It is dangerous to put too much faith in one study. The survey was con-
ducted some time ago on Swedish doctors and patients and may have lim-
ited applicability to doctors and patients in the United States. Nevertheless,
the study is interesting for two reasons in particular. First, it suggests that
patients are more open-minded about deceptive placebos than we may ex-
pect. 56 Second, the survey raises questions about the need for the AMA's
policy change, since the survey provides some evidence that physicians are
more resistant to deceptive placebos than patients are. If patients are, in fact,
more willing to receive deceptive placebos than the conventional wisdom
suggests, deceptive placebos may be less likely to violate patient autonomy
than the conventional wisdom suggests, a point I return to in Part III.
"sugar pills" and that other portions of the survey made clear that sugar pills
are used as placebos. E-mail from Niels Lyn6e, Deputy Dir. & Professor of
Med. Ethics, Centre for Bioethics, Karolinska Institutet & Uppsala University,
to Adam J. Kolber (Aug. 13, 2007, 15:24:43 CEST) (on file with the Yale Law &
Policy Review).
151. Lynoe et al., supra note 148, at 769, 770 tbl.2.
152. Id. at 769.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 770 tbl.3.
155. Id.
156. Importantly, the survey asked questions of respondents in third-person fash-
ion. Were patients asked how they would like to be treated under various hy-
pothetical scenarios, their answers might have differed significantly.
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C. Causation
To succeed in a suit for failure to obtain informed consent, plaintiffs
generally must also show that the doctor's failure to disclose caused some
pertinent injury. 57 If a patient would have proceeded with a treatment even
if he had received adequate disclosure, the failure to provide that disclosure
was not the cause of the pertinent injury. 58 Most courts apply an objective
test, asking whether "a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position
would not have consented to the procedure if suitably informed."'59 A mi-
nority of states use a subjective test, asking whether this particular plaintiff
would have consented even with adequate disclosure. 60
Once again, the tests transfer poorly to the deceptive placebo context.
Neither a reasonably prudent person, nor any person for that matter, could
consent to a deceptive treatment because doing so is logically impossible.
One simply cannot disclose to a patient a treatment that by definition re-
quires non-disclosure. So, in some sense, a physician's lack of disclosure of
deceptive placebo use is always a but-for cause of its actual use. A better test
might instead ask the hypothetical question, "If a reasonable patient were
informed about deceptive placebo use and asked to consent prior to receiv-
ing a safe drug that would make him forget the discussion, would the rea-
sonable patient have done so?'"6' This question avoids the problem created
by informed consent causation requirements, which are essentially incom-
patible with deceptive placebo use. Informed consent doctrine usually serves
to reduce the information asymmetry between doctors and patients, so it is
not surprising that the doctrine is poorly suited to govern treatments that
depend on that asymmetry to promote their effectiveness.
157. But see infra Section II.E (discussing battery theories of informed consent
liability).
158. FURROW ET AL., supra note 102, § 6-14, at 333.
159. Mitchell v. Kayem, 54 S.W.3d 775, 779 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (describing the
informed consent standard as applied to the risks associated with treatment).
160. Leyson v. Steuermann, 705 P.2d 37 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985); FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 102, § 6-14, at 334.
161. Philosopher Derek Parfit suggests that "if you had the ability to make yourself
lose particular memories," we could solve certain "technical" problems of
consent by obtaining consent prior to memory erasure. Derek Parfit, Climb-
ing the Mountain 87 (Dec. 28, 20o6) (unpublished manuscript), http:// indi-
vidual.utoronto.ca/stafforini/parfit/parfit - climbingthe-mountain.pdf; see
also Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications
of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2006) (discussing emerging ef-
forts to pharmaceutically dampen memory intensity).
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D. Therapeutic Privilege
The doctrine of informed consent provides for certain exceptions to the
disclosure duty when, for example, a patient is unconscious and needs im-
mediate medical attention. 62 As I noted, there is also an exception when a
patient has waived his right to informed consent. 63 More controversially,
doctors sometimes have a "therapeutic privilege" to limit disclosure "when
risk-disclosure poses such a threat of detriment to the patient as to become
unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of view.
" 164
The rule was most famously explicated in the D.C. Circuit's opinion in
Canterbury v. Spence, in which the court suggested that under certain cir-
cumstances, doctors are permitted to withhold medical information when
doing so is in the patient's best interests:
It is recognized that patients occasionally become so ill or emotion-
ally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational decision, or
complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose psycho-
logical damage to the patient. Where that is so, the cases have gen-
erally held that the physician is armed with a privilege to keep the
information from the patient, and we think it clear that portents of
that type may justify the physician in action he deems medically
warranted. The critical inquiry is whether the physician responded
to a sound medical judgment that communication of the risk in-
formation would present a threat to the patient's well-being.'65
162. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("When a genuine
emergency... arises, it is settled that the impracticality of conferring with the
patient dispenses with need for [obtaining informed consent].").
163. See supra Subsection II.A.2.
164. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789; see also Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 377
(Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (identifying an exception to informed consent require-
ments "when risk-disclosure poses such a serious psychological threat of det-
riment to the patient as to be medically contraindicated" (quoting Culbertson
v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ind. 1992))); Kathleen M. Boozang, Death
Wish: Resuscitating Self-Determination for the Critically Ill, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 23,
55-62 (1993) (describing the therapeutic privilege).
165. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789 (footnotes omitted); see also Boozang, supra note
164, at 23, 55-62 (1993) ("Overall, the ill-defined therapeutic privilege operates
in too many instances as an escape hatch for the physician who wishes to
avoid discussing end-of-life treatment issues with his patient because he re-
mains skeptical about the concept of informed consent, continues to rely on
the myth that patients cannot cope with news of poor prognoses, or is per-
sonally uncomfortable confronting patients for whom he can do no more
than provide comfort care.").
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The therapeutic privilege was applied in Nishi v. Hartwell,'66 in which a
patient suffering from chest pains was partially paralyzed after having an
adverse reaction to the contrast medium used in a radiological procedure to
detect an aneurysm.'6 7 The patient, who happened to be a dentist, was not
informed of the risk of having such a reaction, because his doctors believed
that he was "very frightened about his condition." 6 They implied that,
because of the patient's hypertension and other ailments, revealing the risk
of paralysis or death "would have been a terrible mistake" '169 that could have
made his condition worse. The court held that the failure to disclose the risk
fell "clearly within the exception to the duty of full disclosure" under the
therapeutic privilege. 1
70
The privilege was not designed, however, to address the issues raised in
cases of deceptive placebo administration. For example, in Canterbury and
Nishi, the courts spoke of the therapeutic privilege to withhold information
about the risks of a contemplated treatment, and mentioned nothing about
a privilege to withhold information about the nature of a treatment. More
importantly, the vitality of the therapeutic privilege may be diminishing as
part of a general trend in medical ethics toward increased disclosure. Even
in Canterbury, the court emphasized that the privilege "must be carefully
circumscribed.., for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself.'
71
In particular, the court noted that the privilege was not intended to apply
unless the damage to the patient from disclosure is "menacing." 72 Further-
more, the AMA has recently adopted a policy sharply limiting use of the
therapeutic privilege. 173
166. 473 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1970), overruled on other grounds by Carr v. Strode, 904
P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995).
167. Id. at 118.
168. Id. at 120.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 121.
171. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The privilege does
not accept the paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent sim-
ply because divulgence might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physi-
cian feels the patient really needs. That attitude presumes instability or per-
versity for even the normal patient, and runs counter to the foundation prin-
ciple that the patient should and ordinarily can make the choice for himself.")
172. Id.
173. It appears that the AMA now considers the therapeutic privilege, if it still
exists at all, to be a privilege only to gradually reveal information to a patient
rather than a privilege to indefinitely withhold information. COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. AsS'N, WITHHOLDING INFORMATION
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Though the AMA provides no exceptions to its placebo deception ban,
one could plausibly argue that the therapeutic privilege should nevertheless
apply to some cases of placebo deception. Sometimes, revealing the nature
of a deceptive placebo treatment could be thought "unfeasible or contrain-
dicated from a medical point of view." '174 Furthermore, as a matter of devel-
oping the doctrine, one could argue that it is too simplistic to require that
the privilege only be available where the risks of disclosure are "menac-
ing." 75 Rather, the doctrine should examine both the risks of disclosure and
the risks of non-disclosure, so that non-disclosure is more permissible in
cases where the interests in disclosure are weak. Under such an analysis,
deceptive placebo use would stand a stronger chance of falling under the
therapeutic privilege, as its low rate of side effects makes it comparatively
less threatening to patient health.
E. Battery Theory of Informed Consent
Nowadays, most courts analyze informed consent cases under a negli-
gence standard. Traditionally, however, courts analyzed informed consent
claims under a battery theory, 17 6 and some courts continue to permit such
claims. 177 Roughly speaking, courts are more sympathetic to battery claims
when the plaintiff argues that he gave no consent at all to some procedure
(not just that he gave consent but was insufficiently informed about the pro-
cedure).' 7 ' The tort theory of battery also requires plaintiffs to show that
there was physical contact between the healthcare provider and the patient,
a requirement easily established, for example, by surgical procedures. 1
79
It is debatable whether deceptive placebo administration is better ana-
lyzed as an intentional battery or as physician negligence when the doctor
has the patient's best interests in mind. The deceived patient consents to
FROM PATIENTS (THERAPEUTIC PRIVILEGE), REPORT 2-A-o6 (2006), available
at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja-recs_2ao6.pdf.
174. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
175. Id.
176. See Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 438-39 (N.J. 1983) (holding that it may con-
stitute tortious battery when a patient gives consent for one physician to per-
form surgery that is actually performed by another); see also Schloendorff v.
Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (treating an informed consent
claim as a trespass to the body).
177. Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1998); FURROW ET AL., supra note
102, § 6-9(b), at 312.
178. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972) ("The battery theory should
be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to
which the patient has not consented."); Blanchard, 975 S.W.2d at 524.
179. FURROW ET AL., supra note 102, § 6-9(b), at 311.
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some treatment-otherwise there would be no placebo effect-but the na-
ture of the treatment is not what the patient expects. In addition, because
the tort of battery requires physical contact, battery may be difficult to es-
tablish when patients are merely given pure placebo pills."' s By contrast, a
patient who receives a saline injection believing that he is receiving an active
medication may more easily establish the physical contact needed to make a
battery-based claim of lack of informed consent.
For a number of reasons, deceived plaintiffs will prefer to raise lack of
informed consent claims under a battery theory. First, when courts proceed
under a battery theory, they may allow damages for dignitary interests even
where there is no showing that the lack of informed consent caused physical
injury.' Second, plaintiffs can collect punitive damages under battery theo-
ries of liability when they can show that healthcare personnel were deceitful
and disregarded patient desires. 2 Third, and most importantly, while
plaintiffs raising a battery claim need to show that there was physical con-
tact without their consent, they need not show that the physician's conduct
fell below the standard of care. Thus, as a matter of doctrine, the AMA's ban
on placebo deception becomes less relevant under a battery theory. As a
practical matter, however, courts that are willing to entertain battery theo-
ries of informed consent tend to do so when the facts of a case seem more
egregious. Now that deceptive placebo administration is deemed unethical
by the medical profession, courts may be more receptive to a charge of bat-
tery against a practitioner who deceptively administers a placebo.
Furthermore, courts are more willing to entertain an informed consent
battery claim when it is alleged that a physician's motivation was nonthera-
peutic, s3 a determination that may be interpreted in light of the norms of
the medical profession. In Freedman v. Superior Court,'84 the plaintiff alleged
180. But see Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 716-18 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
("We find the administration of a drug without the patient's knowledge com-
ports with the meaning of offensive contact. Had the drug been administered
by means of a hypodermic needle, the element of physical contact would
clearly be sufficient. We believe that causing the patient to physically ingest a
pill is indistinguishable in principle.").
181. See Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 701 So. 2d 447, 454-55 (La. 1997) (purporting to use
a negligence theory of informed consent but allowing dignitary damages
when a patient's doctor failed to use requested mesh in a hernia operation,
stating that "[in this type of case, damages for deprivation of self-
determination, insult to personal integrity, invasion of privacy, anxiety, worry
and mental distress are actual and compensatory").
182. FURROW ET AL., supra note 102, § 6-9(b), at 312.
183. Rains v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
184. 263 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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that her doctor had lied to her by representing that she needed to take the
drug Pitocin to prevent infection when in fact the drug's purpose was to
induce labor. The court found that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action for battery, reasoning that, even if medical staff had intentionally
made a false representation, the plaintiff did not allege "that the purpose of
the physicians was other than the rendition of therapeutic treatment." '185
Furthermore, the plaintiff did not "contend[] that the deception by the phy-
sicians was for any independent or improper motive on their part."'8 6 Im-
portantly, the court stated that "the use of a drug or treatment which is ac-
cepted, generally, by the profession, does not become a nontherapeutic use
because the physician prescribes it at the wrong point in the treatment proc-
ess."187 Thus, courts presented with battery claims may be more likely to
decide that deceptive placebo administration is nontherapeutic because the
practice no longer comports with the announced norms of the profession.
In summary, the doctrine of informed consent generally requires
healthcare personnel to make certain disclosures before treatment and to
obtain patient consent. Though the doctrine was not intended to cast judg-
ment over what treatments are acceptable, it seems likely that it now has the
effect of prohibiting deceptive placebo use. While it is difficult to predict
how courts would have handled an informed consent challenge to deceptive
placebo use in the absence of the AMA's new ethics provision, the provision
increases the likelihood that physicians who use placebos deceptively will
face legal action or professional sanctions.
III. CHALLENGING THE CATEGORICAL PROHIBITION
As with much of the literature in bioethics, concerns about deceptive
placebos are frequently rooted in the desire to promote patient auton-
omy. 88 The vague and often elusive concept of autonomy "refer[s] to...
self-governance: personal rule of the self by adequate understanding while
remaining free from controlling interferences by others and from personal
185. Id. at 3.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 ("The deception associated with
placebo use... is now widely viewed as problematic because it directly con-
flicts with contemporary notions of patient autonomy and the practice of
shared decision-making."); COGGINS ET AL., supra note 77, at 3 (stating that
"[r]espect for the dignity of patients and their right to self-determination is a
central ethical tenet of the American Nurses Association's" code of conduct
and that "[n] urses are not only justified in refusing to participate in placebo
use" in the therapeutic context, "they are morally obligated to protect patients
from potential harm and deceptive practices").
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limitations that prevent choice." ' 9 To respect patient autonomy, it is said,
we must "recognize with due appreciation the person's capacities and per-
spective, including his or her right to hold certain views and to take certain
actions based on personal values and beliefs." 9° Deception, it is thought,
prevents patients from making autonomous decisions about their health-
care. According to the Kantian tradition, the vantage point of most auton-
omy theorists, deception is one of "the most fundamental forms of wrong-
doing to others"19' for it fails to treat humans as rational agents who are
ends in themselves.192
When courts analyze informed consent cases, they almost invariably
reference autonomy or autonomy-related principles.'93 In Natanson v. Kline,
for example, the court stated that "Anglo-American law starts with the
premise of thorough-going self determination. It follows that each man is
considered to be master of his own body," and that doctors cannot substi-
tute their judgments for those of their "patient[s] by any form of artifice or
deception."'94
There is little doubt that patient autonomy is desirable, all else being
equal. Frequently, however, all else is not equal, and we must decide how to
make relevant tradeoffs. Patients do not seek out medical care in order to
foster a relationship based on honesty, trust, respect, and autonomous deci-
sion making. Rather, they seek medical care first and foremost to feel better.
No doubt, honesty, trust, respect, and autonomous decision making typi-
cally foster better patient care. If there are tradeoffs, however, between these
values and successful medical outcomes, many of us would favor the latter.
In this part, I argue that a categorical prohibition of deceptive placebos,
like the one recently adopted by the AMA, is not justified based on our cur-
rent knowledge of placebos and patient preferences with respect to placebos.
189. Tom L. Beauchamp, Informed Consent, in MEDICAL ETHICS 185, 195 (Robert
M. Veatch ed., 2d ed. 1997).
190. Id. at 195.
191. Christine Korsgaard, The Right To Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, in CREAT-
ING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 133, 140 (1996).
192. According to Immanuel Kant, "the human being, and in general every ra-
tional being exists as an end in itself, not merely as means to the discretionary
use of this or that will, but in all its actions, those directed toward itself as well
as those directed toward other rational beings, it must always at the same time
be considered as an end." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE META-
PHYSICS OF MORALS 45 (Allen W. Wood ed., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785).
193. As the authors of a health law hornbook put it, "Patient autonomy in medical
decisionmaking is the underlying principle in all consent cases." FURROW ET
AL., supra note 102, § 6-9(b), at 311.
194. 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960).
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In particular, I describe deficiencies in the standard autonomy rationale for
prohibiting deceptive placebos and argue that the scope of the AMA prohi-
bition is broader than necessary. I instead identify what I take to be one of
the most serious concerns about deceptively induced placebo effects-that
they are scarce medical resources and must therefore be used sparingly-but
I suggest that this concern does not give us grounds to categorically prohibit
placebo deception at present.
A. Inconsistent with Some Patients' Preferences
In order for doctors to violate a patient's autonomy by using deceptive
placebos, it must be the case that the patient is opposed to taking a placebo
without his consent. The standard autonomy-based argument against thera-
peutic deception assumes that patients are opposed to being treated with
deceptive placebos. As I noted earlier, however, this is not so clear. The lim-
ited data available suggest that patients may be more placebo-friendly than
doctors. When Swedish patients were asked if "physicians ought to give
patients placebos on their own initiative more often," 25% of patients
agreed completely or for the most part, but only 7% of doctors agreed for
the most part and none agreed completely. 195
This result, while not necessarily transferable to the United States, is
nonetheless consistent with other research in the bioethics literature that
shows that "patients little yearn[] to make their own decisions." '196 Though
patients do want to be informed about the treatments they are receiving,197
the fact that they are willing to cede decision making to doctors is some
evidence that, when information disclosure is inconsistent with preferred
therapy, patients may be willing to give up some information disclosure.
At least, we should not be so quick to assume otherwise, for it could be
quite rational for patients to be open to unwittingly receiving placebos,
given that placebos provide real relief from symptoms and may also help
195. Lynoe et al., supra note 148, at 771.
196. Schneider, supra note 72, at 437. A perhaps outdated 1984 study on doctor-
patient decision making found that almost half (47%) of the hypertensive pa-
tients surveyed "preferred that the clinician make the therapeutic decisions
'using all that is known about the medicines' but without the patient's par-
ticipation." William M. Strull et al., Do Patients Want To Participate in Medi-
cal Decision Making?, 252 JAMA 2990, 2992 (1984). One-third of "patients pre-
ferred that the clinician make the decision 'but strongly consider the patient's
opinion."' Id. The same survey presented evidence that doctors tend to over-
estimate the extent to which patients want to make their own medical deci-
sions. Id.
197. Schneider, supra note 72, at 436-37.
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diagnose illness.'98 Furthermore, even if surveys showed that patients were
overwhelmingly against the use of deceptive placebos, we would arguably
want to separate out endogenous opposition to placebo use from whatever
objections patients develop as a result of living in a culture that has spent
the last half century reminding them in various ways that they should be
upset about deceptive therapies.
B. Inconsistent with Some Patients' Autonomy
If indeed some patients would consider deceptive placebo use a valuable
therapy for themselves, then it is the autonomous preference of those pa-
tients to have the truth about their treatment withheld when doing so is the
most therapeutic option. This points to an internal tension in the standard
autonomy rationale for prohibiting deceptive placebo use: sometimes, re-
fusal to deceptively use placebos may violate patients' interests in limited
disclosure.
Consider the following example, where a patient makes clear that she
does not want to discuss her prognosis with her doctor:
Mrs. B will undergo surgery in two or three days for a malignant
tumor of her right breast. She has obviously understood her situa-
tion intellectually, but her mood has been rather blas6 and she ap-
pears to be rather inappropriately minimizing the emotional gravity
of her situation. Dr. T's experience is that women in Mrs. B's situa-
tion who before mastectomy do not experience some grief and at
least moderate concern about the physical and cosmetic implica-
tions of their operation often have a very severe and depressive
post-operative course. Though Mrs. B has insisted that she does not
wish to talk about the effects of the surgery, Dr. T talks with her
about such effects prior to surgery in order to facilitate her emo-
tional preparation for her impending loss. 199
In this example, Dr. T acts paternalistically by revealing information that
Mrs. B does not want to know,200 at least at present. Dr. T has failed, in ef-
fect, to respect Mrs. B's autonomy, by imposing on her, for entirely thera-
peutic reasons, what his experience and judgment tells him is best for her.
Had Dr. T refrained from pressing her to discuss the operation, he would
have better respected her autonomy, though possibly at some cost to the
overall well-being of her postoperative self.
198. See Boozang, supra note 8, at 727-39 (suggesting that "the reasonable patient
would opt to experience the benefits of placebo therapy without having the
truth revealed to her").
199. Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver, Paternalistic Behavior, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
45, 49 (1976).
200. See id.
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Similarly, doctors who refrain from administering deceptive placebos
are imposing a particular view of treatment decision making on their pa-
tients. Granted, doctors do not necessarily know which of their patients
would be willing to participate in deceptive therapy. As noted earlier, col-
lecting specific patients' preferences on the matter interferes to some extent
with the efficacy of deceptive therapy.2° ' However, surely some patients are
willing to receive deceptive placebos. If more patients oppose deceptive
treatment than are open to it, perhaps we maximize autonomy interests
with a categorical prohibition. However, the above example illustrates that:
(1) claims about patient preferences are empirical assertions (and these as-
sertions are dynamically influenced by our current informed consent re-
gime) and (2) we cannot always respect patient autonomy in the deceptive
placebo context because patients do not have uniform preferences with
respect to this issue.
C. Overinclusive
Another problem with the AMA's categorical prohibition on deceptive
placebos is that it is overinclusive. Even an ardent defender of patient
autonomy would have difficulty defending a prohibition on therapeutic
deception that has no exceptions. As a general matter, we should sometimes
deceive people for their own benefit. For example, if a suicidal person
threatens to jump off the roof of a building, a police officer may falsely tell
him that he will not be taken into custody if he climbs down, assuming such
insincere reassurance is needed to protect the jumper's life.
Nor are such exceptions limited to interactions with people who are sui-
cidal. Derek Parfit imagines a case where A knows that, unless he tells some
lie to B, B will believe, quite accurately, that C has murdered someone. Be-
cause B would be incapable of effectively concealing this knowledge from C,
C would then murder B as well.20 2 The question is whether it is acceptable
for A to lie to B for B's benefit. Parfit argues that lying in such situations is
not only permissible, it is morally required:
If I told you the truth, you could reasonably complain with your dy-
ing breath that I ought to have saved your life by deceiving you. I
could not plausibly reply that, since I could not have deceived you
with your consent, this way of saving your life would have been
wrong. My life-saving lie would be like life-saving surgery on some
unconscious person. Just as this person would consent to this sur-
gery if she could, you would consent to my deceiving you. It is a
201. See supra Section II.A.
202. Parfit, supra note 161, at 87.
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merely technical problem that, if I asked you for your consent, that
would make my deceiving you impossible.2"3
While it is difficult in the deceptive placebo context to imagine a case where
the practice must be used to save someone's life, perhaps there are instances
where a placebo extends a person's life, at least for a short period. Further-
more, even if placebos are not life-extending, there are circumstances where
deceptive placebo use arguably ought to be permissible to aid in diagnosis or
to reduce patient suffering.
1. High Diagnostic Value
One area where placebos may have considerable diagnostic value is in
distinguishing those who have epilepsy, a neurological disorder associated
with abnormal neuronal activity, from those who have pseudoseizures,
which are attacks that resemble epileptic seizures but are considered psycho-
logical in origin.2"4 It is important to distinguish the two because "[t]he cost
of pseudoseizures misdiagnosed as epilepsy can be extremely high, from
both a financial and a psychosocial standpoint, with repeated hospitaliza-
tions, unnecessary medications, loss of work, loss of driving privileges, and
strain on interpersonal relationships all contributing to overall disability." 205
One reliable method of distinguishing such seizures is to examine a patient's
brain using electroencephalography during a seizure.20 6 The occurrence of a
seizure is unpredictable, however, so this method can be prohibitively ex-
* 207pensive.
A number of studies have suggested that doctors can use deceptive pla-
cebos to induce a seizure in those who have pseudoseizures but not in those
who have epilepsy.20 8 For example, in one study, subjects were given a vari-
ety of tests to determine if they had epilepsy or pseudoseizures. Among
those tests, they received a saline injection (a pure placebo) after hearing the
following deceptive instructions:
With your permission, we would like to try to bring on one of your
events using an injected medication that has been designed to lower
seizure threshold. Basically, what the drug does is lower the natural
resistance your brain has to having one of your events. It is similar
to a medication injected into hospital patients every day, but in
203. Id.
204. See Jeremy D. Slater et al., Induction of Pseudoseizures with Intravenous Saline
Placebo, 36 EPILEPSIA 580, 580 (1995).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 584.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 580 (citing the literature).
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your case has been specially prepared to induce seizures. In normal
people the injection does nothing, while in patients with seizures
the injection has a greater than 90% chance of bringing on an epi-
sode.209
Using this approach, almost all of those diagnosed with pseudoseizures were
induced to have a seizure, while the technique did "not provoke seizures in
patients with epilepsy. 21 0 The researchers claimed that this technique was
superior to basing diagnosis "solely on clinical appearance," which "creates
a serious risk of misdiagnosis. "211 Nevertheless, the AMA's categorical pro-
hibition on deceptive placebo use would prohibit the use of this test in clini-
cal contexts.
2. High Therapeutic Value
In other cases, we may want to use placebos not for their diagnostic
value but for their therapeutic value. Consider the following scenario: Dur-
ing a bad bout of depression, a patient begins psychotherapy and antide-
pressants. The regimen works quite well for several weeks, and the depres-
sion gradually gets under control. Soon after, however, doctors discover that
the patient has an unrelated liver condition that requires him to discontinue
his use of antidepressants. After ceasing medication, the patient's mental
health quickly declines. The patient's psychiatrist is aware of considerable
medical literature finding powerful placebo effects in the treatment of de-
pression 212 and knows of several researchers who claim that pharmaceutical
antidepressants may not be much more effective than placebos. 2 3 The psy-
chiatrist, therefore, provides the patient with two weeks worth of placebo
pills and misleadingly states that they are antidepressants that are likely to
help the patient without causing any worrisome side effects. After two
weeks, the patient reports feeling much better. When the doctor reveals the
nature of the pills, the patient is disconcerted at first, but the psychiatrist
explains to the patient that the experience reveals the patient's own ability to
work through his emotional problems and shows that he will now be better
able to manage depression with psychotherapy alone.
209. Id. at 582.
210. Id. at 584. One patient in the study was deemed to have both epilepsy and
pseudoseizures. Id. at 585.
211. Id. at 584.
212. Brown, supra note 23, at 265; see Kirsch, supra note 28, at 167 ("23 percent of
the response to antidepressant medication is due to spontaneous remission,
27 percent is due to the drug, and 50 percent is due to expectancy.").
213. See Joanna Moncrieff & Irving Kirsch, Efficacy ofAntidepressants in Adults, 331
BMJ 155, 157 (2005) (citing sources).
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Of course, how one reacts to this story may depend in large measure on
how it ends. That the story ends well is plausible, which is good reason to
engage in further research before prohibiting the deceptive use of placebos.
To make the case more appealing, we could add a variety of precautions on
the deceptive use of placebos. For example, we could require physicians:
(i) to consult with one or more other physicians or with an ethics commit-
tee before using a deceptive placebo,2"4 (2) to document the use of a decep-
tive placebo, perhaps in hospital or patient medical records, 211 (3) to obtain
the informed consent of a relative or guardian if possible," 6 and (4) to re-
veal to a patient that he was secretly given placebos within a reasonable time
after commencing treatment.1 7 I do not endorse any of these requirements
in particular, but they illustrate the wide range of options available to limit
deceptive placebo use without recourse to a categorical prohibition.
D. Unintended Consequences
The AMA prohibition is also likely to have unintended consequences.
Its broad wording, taken literally, dictates informed consent practices in
areas that were almost certainly never intended to fall under its purview. For
example, the most common use of pure placebos, by a large margin, is in
birth control treatment regimens, used by millions of women each day in
the United States.218 The majority of oral contraceptive treatments are sold
in one-pill-per-day packets of twenty-eight pills, seven of which are place-
bos.219 Unlike placebos designed to reduce pain or relieve anxiety, these
placebos are designed to help women maintain a consistent pill-taking
regimen, as irregular usage is a common reason why oral contraceptives fail
to prevent pregnancy. According to one study, 47% of those taking birth
control pills miss one pill per cycle and 22% miss two or more. 220 Further-
more, "[w]omen who did not have an established routine for their pill-
214. Bok, supra note 27, at 59.
215. Id.
216. This precaution is likely inconsistent with current laws protecting patient
privacy and might also sow intra-familial conflict.
217. On the other hand, this might be ill advised for reasons I discuss infra, Section
III.F.
218. Michael J. Rosenberg et al., Compliance, Counseling and Satisfaction with Oral
Contraceptives: A Prospective Evaluation, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 89, 89 (1998).
219. Martha Williams-Deane & Linda S. Potter, Current Oral Contraceptive Use
Instructions: An Analysis of Patient Package Inserts, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 111,
111 (1992) (stating that 70% of women on oral contraceptives use a 28-day pill
regimen with seven placebos, while 30% use a 21-day regimen with no place-
bos).
220. Rosenberg et al., supra note 218, at 90.
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taking were 3.6 times as likely to miss two or more pills per cycle as were
women who did have a routine."
221
There are powerful reasons why doctors should be required to inform
women of the placebo nature of their birth control reminder pills. It is im-
portant for pill-takers to understand that active pills and placebos are differ-
ent, particularly because, if a woman misses a placebo, she need not respond
as she would if she had missed an active pill (though these directions could
be delivered without revealing that the placebos have no pharmacological
effect). 222 Furthermore, many women want to know the placebo nature of
their reminder pills because they would rather not engage in an otherwise
meaningless pill-taking ritual seven times a month.
Nevertheless, given the connection between regularity of pill-taking and
successful contraception, the precise method by which oral contraception
instructions are given can, in the aggregate, lead to many unplanned preg-
nancies. Ought the director of a clinic that provides birth control pills to
girls in their early teens be required to make perfectly clear that some pills
are just reminders? Maybe yes, maybe no. The point is that the AMA prohi-
bition, probably unintentionally, seems to take a stand on this issue. Fur-
thermore, it takes a stand that is likely more aggressive about disclosure
than the law of informed consent would have required prior to the AMA's
placebo prohibition, as the failure to reveal that inert birth control pills are
placebos probably would have been deemed too immaterial to create legal
liability.22
3
E. Underinclusive and Easily Subverted
Another problem with the AMA policy is that it is underinclusive, per-
mitting a great deal of behavior that differs only immaterially from prohib-
ited conduct. The AMA expressly prohibits only the deceptive use of a "sub-
stance provided to a patient that the physician believes has no specific
221. Id.
222. Some birth control patient package inserts seem to gloss over the fact that
some of the pills in the package have no medical purpose other than to serve
as reminders. See, e.g., Warner Chilcott, Ovcon Package Insert (March 20o6),
http://www.warnerchilcott.com/pdfs/pi/pi-ovcon-35-5o-compact.pdf.
223. Perhaps one could argue that a birth control "treatment" consists not of indi-
vidual pills but rather of a monthly set of pills. In that case, the monthly
treatment taken as a whole does have specific pharmacological effects on fer-
tility, such that the overall treatment is not a placebo. However, a treatment
regimen that sometimes uses active drugs and sometimes uses pure placebos
does require disclosure, according to the AMA's approach. See AMA REPORT,
supra note 3, at 2. It is not clear why the happenstance of birth control pack-
aging should lead to a different result.
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pharmacological effect upon the condition being treated." '22 4 Thus, a doctor
does not violate at least the "letter of the law" when he prescribes a sub-
stance that he believes has only a one in one-thousand chance (or even a
one in ten-thousand chance) of having a specific pharmacological effect. As
the probability of having a specific pharmacological effect gets low enough,
however, the effect loses its medical significance. Thus, the AMA policy,
narrowly construed, permits deceptive administration of what is essentially
a placebo so long as there is a tiny, medically irrelevant possibility that the
substance will have a specific effect.
Similarly, the AMA's categorical prohibition can be easily subverted by
adding minute quantities of active medications to inactive substances. Sup-
pose a doctor creates a solution of morphine that is much more dilute than
usual. The solution may well have a very high probability of having a spe-
cific pharmacological effect. However, as the morphine concentration gets
sufficiently low, the morphine's effect becomes clinically insignificant. As-
suming that such treatments are permitted under the AMA policy, the pol-
icy is underinclusive relative to the AMA's expressed goals. It hardly respects
patient autonomy to prohibit deceptive treatments that have a zero prob-
ability of having specific effects while allowing deceptive treatments that
have a high likelihood of having negligible specific effects.
Perhaps opponents of the AMA ban should be pleased that the ban is
both underinclusive and easily subverted. On the other hand, some efforts
to subvert the rule may have undesirable consequences. Without the new
AMA policy, a certain number of doctors would have prescribed pure pla-
cebos. With the new AMA policy, however, use of pure placebos becomes
riskier, because their use is hard to conceal. If a doctor's deception unravels,
he can offer no pretense to a professional discipline committee for giving a
patient sugar pills. Thus, as a result of the new AMA policy, some doctors
who would have prescribed pure placebos may instead prescribe impure
placebos to make their deception harder to identify.
Such a shift may work against patient interests for several reasons. First,
impure placebos are more likely to have harmful side effects than pure ones.
Recall our earlier discussion of European doctors who prescribe magnesium
as an impure placebo to ease patient anxiety.225 The magnesium supple-
ments they prescribe, while generally quite safe, have riskier side effects and
drug interactions than ordinary sugar pills have.226 Second, active medica-
224. AMA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added).
225. See supra Section I.B. Here, I make the assumption that these doctors believe
that there is a zero probability that the magnesium will actually treat a min-
eral deficiency that causes anxiety-like symptoms, so that their use of magne-
sium clearly falls under the AMA prohibition.
226. See Univ. of Md. Med. Ctr., Magnesium, http://www.umm.edu/altmed/
ConsSupplements/Magnesiumcs.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2007) ("Too much
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tions are typically more expensive than inactive medications. Third, some
active medications, like antibiotics, can be used in a manner that reduces the
efficacy of the drug for everyone.
2 7
If there is any advantage to prescribing magnesium over a sugar pill to
treat depression, it comes from the fact that using magnesium makes the
clinician's deception harder to detect. Yet the practice is no less deceptive. In
fact, a clinician who prescribes impure placebos may be acting more decep-
tively precisely because the deception is more difficult to detect. Perhaps the
higher financial costs and greater risk of side effects associated with impure
placebos can be justified on the grounds that, by hiding patient deception,
we create a faqade of doctor-patient trust. Such a rationale, however, is en-
tirely inconsistent with the AMA's stated interests in patient autonomy and
joint doctor-patient decision making that prompted the creation of the pro-
hibition in the first place.
F. Deception as a Scarce Medical Resource
Clearly there are many ways to misuse placebos. They may be used in-
appropriately to undermedicate pain, to dispatch with trouble some or an-
noying patients, or to soothe a patient temporarily at the expense of a more
careful and accurate diagnosis. We need not rely on the AMA's placebo
prohibition in such cases, however, as patients may be able to seek malprac-
tice remedies for placebo misuse just as they would for any other negligent
treatment. Even when used conscientiously, however, placebos do present
risks that (1) patients will lose trust in their doctors if the deception is un-
covered, particularly in an age where patients have increasingly sophisti-
cated access to medical information and medical records; (2) patients will
think they must have a pill or other medical treatments whenever they are
sick, even when such treatments are not necessary; (3) patients will receive
inadequate or improper care from other health professionals not involved in
the deception who receive an inaccurate picture of the patients' medica-
tions; and (4) patients will develop placebo side effects, which can even in-
clude addictions to inert substances that the patients believe are active.228
magnesium can cause serious health problems including nausea, vomiting,
severely lowered blood pressure, slowed heart rate, deficiencies of other min-
erals, confusion, coma, and even death. More common side effects from
magnesium include upset stomach and diarrhea."). Also, magnesium sup-
plements can affect the activity of other pharmaceuticals. Id.
227. See Linder, supra note 17, at 2321 (citing evidence of antibiotic overprescrip-
tion and recognizing the risk of bacterial resistance).
228. Sissela Bok recounts the following story:
In one case a psychotic patient was given placebo pills and told they
were a "new major tranquilizer without any side effects." After four
years she was taking 12 tablets a day and complaining of insomnia
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A big concern about therapeutic deception is that patients who discover
the deception will be upset and lose trust in their doctors or avoid seeking
future medical care. Unfortunately, this claim has hardly been studied or
carefully examined. Still, there are a few reasons to cabin the scope of this
concern. First, I know of no evidence that deceptive pure placebos caused a
loss in trust between doctors and patients in the days when deceptive pure
placebos were used more frequently. Second, in particular cases in which a
deceptive placebo is administered but never revealed, the patient remains
unaware of the placebo use and develops no grounds to distrust his doctor.
Third, in cases in which placebo administration is revealed but it has ac-
complished its intended purpose better than the available alternatives, it is
not at all clear that patients will lose trust in their caregivers on account of
the deception. If there are lingering feelings of distrust, patients may be
eased by detailed explanations of the reasons that their doctors proceeded as
they did. Nevertheless, even if we question whether patients should be upset
about deception or whether they should distrust doctors who deceive them
in a way that best promotes their health, as an empirical matter, therapeutic
deception certainly may pose a risk to the doctor-patient relationship.
Importantly, concerns about the loss of patient trust go well beyond a
fear that a particular patient will lose trust in his placebo-prescribing physi-
cian. After all, when deceptive placebos are skillfully employed, only a small
minority of patients are likely to discover that they have been deceived.
I think a more serious threat is posed by the self-defeating quality of
placebo deception. The more frequently that placebos are deceptively ad-
ministered in society, the more patients will eventually become aware of the
practice and begin to doubt that they have been administered "specific"
therapies for their ailments, even when they have been. The mere possibility
that one may deceptively receive a placebo is enough to weaken the placebo
effect of all therapies. In order to retain a sizeable quantity of placebo-
related improvement in all patients, we must not squander our use of place-
bos, for each use threatens the next.229
and anxiety. After the self-medication reached 25 pills a day and a
crisis had occurred, the physician intervened, talked over the addic-
tive problem (but not the deception) with the patient and succeeded
in reducing the dose to two a day, a level that was still being main-
tained a year later.
Bok, supra note 18, at 20; see also BRODY, supra note 9, at io8 (noting that
placebos can be addictive); Bok, supra note 27, at 58 (discussing placebo side
effects, including addiction).
229. Even if patients are unaware that they are receiving placebos, the placebo
effect may gradually diminish when repeatedly elicited. See Connie Peck &
Grahame Coleman, Implications of Placebo Theory for Clinical Research and
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Put differently, deceptive placebo use is a scarce medical resource. The
more often therapeutic deception is used, the less effective it will be. Thera-
peutic deception cannibalizes itself. If there were no legal, moral, or stig-
matic prohibitions on deceptive placebo use, doctors might overprescribe
deceptive placebos. Doing so would make it harder for all doctors to treat
their patients, as patients would begin to doubt the efficacy of whatever
treatments they received-placebo or otherwise. Given this incentive struc-
ture, there may indeed be reasons to limit placebo use.
One piece of evidence that placebo efficacy could decline based on so-
cietal expectations of increased placebo use is supported by evidence of the
opposite phenomenon: placebo effects increase when patients have height-
ened expectations of treatment efficacy. A 2002 article in the Journal of the
American Medical Association examined clinical trials for depression pub-
lished between 1981 and 2000. The studies showed significant variation in
terms of the percentage of patients who showed clinically significant im-
provement from placebos, ranging from a low of 12.5% to a high of more
than 50%.23o Importantly, the proportion of subjects responding to placebos
increased over time, "at the rate of approximately 7% per decade, and a
similar increase has occurred in the fraction of patients responding to active
medication." '231 The researchers think that there has been a genuine change
in the rate of placebo response that "does not appear to be directly ex-
plained by changes in study characteristics." '232 One possibility is that pla-
cebo response rates are changing because subjects with milder, easier-to-
treat depression are increasingly participating in research experiments.233
This explanation is still speculative, however, leading one researcher to joke,
"They're making placebos better and better.
234
Placebo responses to antidepressants may indeed be getting better and
better, particularly if the public has raised its expectations of the likelihood
that such drugs will help them, perhaps from increased direct-to-consumer
pharmaceutical advertising. Of course, if perceptions of drug efficacy can
change for the better, they may also change for the worse. Such might be the
Practice in Pain Management, 12 THEORETICAL MED. 247, 252 (1991) (discuss-
ing "placebo sag"); accord Boozang, supra note 8, at 719.
230. B. Timothy Walsh et al., Placebo Response in Studies of Major Depression:
Variable, Substantial, and Growing, 287 JAMA 1840, 1842 (2002).
231. Id. at1844.
232. Id.
233. See id.
234. Jay Dixit, New! Improved! And Still ioo Percent Fake, WASH. POST, May 18,
2002, at Bi (quoting Walsh).
26 : 75 2007
A LIMITED DEFENSE OF CLINICAL PLACEBO DECEPTION
case if the public gradually increased its suspicions that doctors are decep-
tively prescribing placebos.
As noted, there are other reasons to limit deceptive placebo use. Doctors
might be inclined to overuse placebos to save themselves time or money at
the expense of a more careful diagnosis or of a more satisfying long-term
doctor-patient relationship. Yet, none of these concerns demonstrates that
the optimal level of therapeutic deception is zero. Even if malpractice reme-
dies underdeter inappropriate placebo use because placebo deception is
hard to detect, a categorical ban may still be excessive.
The current level of therapeutic deception, as surveys show, is well
above zero; yet relatively few patients seem to fear that their doctors are
prescribing placebos. It is, admittedly, an open question whether the current
level of therapeutic deception in the United States, poorly understood as it
is, is too high or too low. Given all the uncertainty, why do I say that a pro-
hibition is not yet justified? Why do I put the burden on the ban's support-
ers to justify the prohibition rather than give myself the burden of justifying
its absence? The answer, I will suggest in the next Part, relates to the paucity
of litigation on placebo deception.
IV. BURDEN-SHIFTING AND PROPOSED RESEARCH AGENDA
In this Part, I suggest that while there are many possible reasons why
deceptive placebo use is so rarely litigated, the fact that there are so few
complainants ought to have given the AMA pause before enacting a cate-
gorical prohibition. I also propose an interdisciplinary research agenda to
enable us to better understand the reasons why placebo deception is so
rarely litigated and to better regulate deceptive placebo therapies. I conclude
by noting how the issues raised by deceptive placebos recur in other areas of
law and public policy as part of the debate over beneficent deception more
generally.
A. Explaining the Paucity of Cases
While informed consent negligence and battery claims are probably the
most obvious sources of liability for those who deceptively administer pla-
cebos, there are other theories that plaintiff-patients could pursue. In some
cases, doctors who deceptively use placebos may face liability under theories
of fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and non-informed-
consent theories of malpractice. Doctors also risk sanctions by professional
disciplinary committees.235 They could even face criminal charges for bat-
tery or for selling a simulated controlled substance." 6 Despite plausible
235. See supra note 6.
236. See, e.g., TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 482.002 (Vernon 2003) (mak-
ing it a crime to "knowingly or intentionally... deliver[] a simulated con-
trolled substance" while expressly or implicitly representing that it is a con-
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theories for taking action against physicians and other health professionals
for deceptive placebo use, however, it almost never happens.
While a number of published cases have fact patterns that describe or
allege deceptive placebo administration, 37 only one case addresses the prac-
tice directly (under a theory of fraud, perhaps because the statute of limita-
tions had run on malpractice-related claims). In the 1976 case of
Jurcich v. General Motors Corp.,2 3 8 plaintiff Emil Jurcich was a factory worker
who injured his back on the job and was treated for the injury by a nurse
and doctor at the plant dispensary.23 9 Among his treatments, he was secretly
given sugar pills.24° Jurcich eventually discovered the deception at a worker's
trolled substance). Importantly, this statute makes an exception for medical
practitioners "acting in the legitimate performance of [their] professional du-
ties," id., though the practice of placebo deception seems less legitimate after
the AMA prohibition. See also State v. Marion, 27 P.3d 924, 926-27 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2001) (overturning a conviction for possession with intent to deliver a
simulated controlled substance because the defendant's imitation crack co-
caine did not have labels or promotional materials indicating that the sub-
stance simulated a controlled substance as required for conviction under the
Kansas statute); Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en
banc) (interpreting the Texas statute).
237. See, e.g., Burton v. Cameron County, 884 F. Supp. 234, 239 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(prisoner's assault and battery claims against medical personnel for use of
placebo barred by statute of limitations); Lawhorn v. Duckworth, 736 F. Supp.
1501, 1502 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (prisoner alleges placebo administration in lieu of
necessary medications); Ching v. Hotz, 204 So.2d 73, 73-74 (La. Ct. App. 1968)
(undisclosed form of placebo probably used to calm the patient's nerves);
State ex rel. Gibson v. Missouri Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 365 S.W.2d 773,
777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (chiropractor appealing license revocation for unli-
censed practice of medicine claims use of inert placebo was for a "psychologi-
cal effect[]" to encourage patient to take vitamin pills and that use of ear
drops containing benzocaine at "about 1/25 of the quantity required for medi-
cal effect... does not make the ear drops 'medicine"'); Harder v. F.C. Clin-
ton, Inc., 948 P.2d 298, 307 (Okla. 1997) (sterile water injections for pain com-
plaints).
238. 539 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
239. Id. at 597. As an aside, the name of the physician was Dr. Patient. When a
person has a name that is well suited to his interests or profession (for exam-
ple, the poet William Wordsworth or the neurologist Lord Brain), the name is
called an aptronym. See Sam Roberts, Ms. Rose, by Any Other Name, Might
Still Be a Florist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at 12. In this case, the doctor's
name was distinctly incongruent with his profession and should perhaps be
known as an "inaptronym."
240. Jurcich, 539 S.W.2d at 597.
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compensation hearing... and later brought suit against his doctor, his nurse,
and General Motors for fraud.242 The Missouri Court of Appeals found that
placebos are "a recognized form of medical treatment," and quoted
Jurcich's expert, who said that you never tell a patient you are giving him a
placebo because "[ylou are hoping that you will fool him."2 43 The court
affirmed the lower court's directed verdict against the plaintiff, expressing
doubts that Jurcich presented a fraud claim. The court concluded that he
more properly raised a question of malpractice. 4
The Jurcich court seemed to find that, even if the therapy involved de-
ception, so long as it was a legitimate medical practice, it was not fraudulent.
Importantly, however, the court relied on the fact that Jurcich could not
show any pecuniary loss from the alleged fraudulent conduct.2 45 The un-
usual circumstances that led Jurcich to receive free medical treatment and
hence suffer no pecuniary loss, therefore, leave some open questions. In-
deed, a major logistical difficulty in deceptive placebo treatment is to figure
out how to charge a patient for what are usually less expensive treatments
without thereby revealing the deception.246 In any event, Jurcich is too idio-
syncratic and outdated to enable a meaningful prediction about whether
therapeutic deception can constitute fraud, given the gradual increase in
informed consent disclosure requirements over the last several decades and,
of course, the AMA's recent change to its Code of Medical Ethics.
The fact that there is only one reported case litigating the issue of decep-
tive placebo use raises the following question: If there are plausible theories
for taking legal action against physicians for deceptive placebo use, and
there is substantial evidence that deceptive placebos are used frequently,
why are there not more cases?247 In the context of deceptive impure place-
bos, the answer is not so surprising. As noted, it is extremely difficult to
determine when a physician is prescribing an impure placebo, since it is
often easy to present a plausible theory in which the prescribed medication
could have a positive specific effect on the patient. Therefore, many of these
cases are litigated as simple malpractice cases where a physician is accused of
241. Id. at 599.
242. Id. at 595-97. Dr. Patient died prior to trial, id. at 598 n.1, and does not appear
in the case caption.
243. Id. at 6oo.
244. Id. at 599-6oo.
245. Id. at 6oo-o2.
246. Boozang, supra note 8, at 741.
247. There are certainly plenty of cases alleging other kinds of violations of in-
formed consent. A Westlaw search for "informed consent" turns up thou-
sands of cases.
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failing to adequately diagnose or treat some condition, and the issue of pa-
tient deception gets lost. Determining that a physician's treatment was pla-
cebo-motivated would be difficult indeed and perhaps unnecessary where
the doctor otherwise committed malpractice.
As for the virtual absence of cases evaluating pure placebo use in the
therapeutic context, we could imagine two very different sets of explana-
tions. Proponents of deceptive placebo use might note: (i) placebos are of-
ten helpful to patients; (2) some patients are open to receiving deceptive
placebos; and (3) patients rarely discover the deception, and when they do
discover it, the harms are so trivial that they are not inclined to take legal
action. Opponents of deceptive placebo use might suggest: (1) many patients
have their autonomy interests violated by deceptive placebo use but are just
unaware of it and cannot bring suit; (2) when they happen to discover de-
ceptive placebo use, they are very upset but are unable to bring action be-
cause they cannot demonstrate sufficient harm to make it worth a lawyer's
attention; (3) lawyers have been deterred from bringing suits because of the
absence of supporting precedent; and (4) in contradistinction to the preced-
ing two points, when patients do have a cause of action, we do not see pub-
lished cases because doctors recognize the egregiousness of their actions and
settle quickly.
B. Proposed Research Agenda
The complete story of why there has been so little litigation over decep-
tive placebo administration probably falls in between a purely pro-placebo
and a purely anti-placebo explanation. Nevertheless, I think the dearth of
cases addressing these legal issues should have given the AMA pause before
adopting its categorical prohibition. If deceptive placebos are harmful
enough that they should be prohibited, where are the complainants? We
know that it is difficult to deceive patients when pure placebos are used.
Surely, some patients must discover the deception. Even if deceptive pure
placebo use has been on a sharp decline, why do we not have more cases
from preceding decades while the transition was occurring?
The AMA prohibition increases physicians' legal liability and their risk
of professional discipline. It also gives doctors incentives to shift from pure
placebo administration to the arguably more harmful practice of prescribing
impure placebos-all this to prohibit a practice for which we have little
evidence of harm in the form of complaining parties and much evidence to
suggest that it can be therapeutic. At a minimum, the AMA could have sim-
ply deferred any determination about deceptive placebo use until more evi-
dence is gathered.24
248. Prior to the adoption of its placebo prohibition, the AMA appeared agnostic
about the use of deceptive placebos. The AMA has long required doctors to
"be honest in all professional interactions" and to "strive to report physi-
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I, therefore, propose an interdisciplinary research effort to help us draft
better policies with respect to deceptive placebos. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, we need to understand more about the therapeutic value of placebos.
In particular, we need to know more about: (1) the symptoms that show
improvement with placebos; (2) the extent and duration of placebo-
generated improvement and how these factors vary, if at all, by patient char-
acteristics; 49 (3) the diagnostic value, if any, of using deceptive placebos;
(4) the extent, if any, to which revealed inert substances create placebo ef-
fects without requiring deception; (5) the relationship between partial de-
ception (through advance consent forms or partially deceptive instructions)
and placebo effectiveness; (6) the effects on a patient's well-being of reveal-
ing the placebo nature of a previously effective, concealed placebo; and
(7) the relative costs and benefits of using placebos as compared to other
ways of eliciting placebo-like effects by, for example, fostering more reassur-
ing doctor-patient relationships.
There is an even bigger void in our understanding of the sociology of
deceptive placebo administration, especially in the United States. In particu-
lar, we need to know more about: (1) the extent to which doctors and other
health professionals report using and, as best we can determine, actually use
pure or impure placebos; (2) their beliefs about placebo efficacy and diag-
nostic value and how these beliefs are affected by features of their medical
training; (3) the reasons for their decisions to use or refrain from using a
placebo; and (4) the extent to which their views have already been shaped by
perceived legal, moral, or stigmatic pressures to avoid using placebos and
how they might behave in the absence of those pressures.
Patients and potential patients could be asked similar questions, includ-
ing questions about: (1) their preferences (and the rigidity of their prefer-
cians... engaging in fraud or deception." AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF
MEDICAL ETHICS princ. II (2001), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/category/2512.html. In addition, AMA policy has long required doc-
tors to obtain the informed consent of patients. AM. MED. ASS'N, H-14o.989
Informed Consent and Decision-Making in Health Care, http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pf~new/pLonline (use Policy Finder). Nevertheless, these
broad statements are not generally thought to speak directly to the issue of
deceptive placebos. According to Sissela Bok, there is no evidence that the
AMA's principle requiring honest dealings has been thought to apply to de-
ceptive placebo administration. Bok, supra note 27, at 55; see also Randy
Cohen, Testing, Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 18 (stat-
ing, prior to the recent changes, that the AMA's code of conduct is silent as to
whether doctors may deceptively administer placebos).
249. It has been surprisingly difficult to identify which characteristics of patients, if
any, make them more likely to respond to placebos. Anne Harrington, Intro-
duction to THE PLACEBO EFFECT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION, SU-
pra note 9, at 1, 2-3.
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ences) with respect to the use of deceptive placebos on themselves and on
their close relatives, (2) their beliefs about the frequency with which place-
bos are actually used, (3) their expected loss of trust in a practitioner who
used deceptive placebos, and (4) their preferences as to whether they would
want placebo deception revealed if they responded well to a deceptive pla-
cebo treatment.
Relatedly, some empirical legal research might uncover better explana-
tions for the paucity of deceptive placebo cases. For example, it would be
helpful to gather data on litigation settlements and professional disciplinary
actions in the area of deceptive placebos. Perhaps hospital administrators
could comment on their familiarity with lawsuits related to placebo decep-
tion. Perhaps survey data or anecdotal research could uncover whether
those who subsequently discovered receiving deceptive placebos considered
bringing or, in fact, brought legal action against their health professionals.
No doubt, there are many factors to consider when evaluating the rela-
tive merits of deceptive placebo treatments. Some inquiries raise their own
ethical questions, particularly when studies of the placebo effect work best
on deceived patients.25 ° Yet, the research is much needed both because pla-
cebos, in one form or another, are frequently used and because placebo
effects may explain some of the therapeutic value of virtually every treat-
ment. Furthermore, the efficacy of almost the entirety of our medical appa-
ratus is based on comparisons between experimental treatments and pla-
cebo treatments. All of this research is on surprisingly shaky ground when
placebos, the constant companion of our research experiments, are so
poorly understood.
CONCLUSION
Therapeutic deception is an example of the more general phenomenon
of beneficent deception, meaning any instance in which a person deceives
another when the deception is motivated (at least in part) by a desire to
benefit the deceived. Some instances of beneficent deception may occur in
mundane social interactions. For example, in a book on writing advice,
Robert Boice describes a technique he has used to help others overcome
writer's block. Boice states that he would have "a blocked writer describe
what he or she would write about if the block were magically removed,""2 '
while he surreptitiously recorded the response. At their next meeting, he
250. See Miller et al., supra note 99. Compare Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli,
Deception in Psychology: Moral Costs and Benefits of Unsought Self-Knowledge,
13 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 259 (2006) (defending some uses of deception in
psychological research) with Andreas Ortmann & Ralph Hertwig, The Costs of
Deception: Evidence from Psychology, 5 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 111 (2002) (sup-
porting a prohibition among experimental economists on deceptive research).
251. ROBERT BOICE, PROFESSORS AS WRITERS 2 (1990).
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would present a typed transcript made from the recording-a technique
which "worked beautifully to get writers started," though "it annoyed many
of them."2"2 Thus, Boice misled those who sought his advice in an effort to
advance their writing, the very reason they sought his aid in the first place.
Others instances of beneficent deception speak directly to core features
of government transparency. For example, in the late 199os, administrators
in the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy made a deal
with television networks that, in essence, used funds devoted to public ser-
vice announcements to instead weave anti-drug messages into popular tele-
vision shows like ER, Beverly Hills 90210, and The Cosby Show.253 By doing
so, the government quite likely expected to convey its beneficent anti-drug
message more effectively, more expansively, and less expensively than it
would have otherwise.254 The typical viewer, however, could easily be misled
into thinking that he was watching a show devoid of government-sponsored
advertising;25 5 indeed, that very misconception may have made the anti-
drug message more effective.256
252. Id.
253. Bonnie Brennen, Communication and Freedom: An Althusserian Reading of
Media-Government Relations, 7 JAVNOST-THE PUBLIC 5, 10-11 (2000). For
example, Barry McCaffrey, then-director of the White House Office of Na-
tional Drug Control Policy, told a House appropriations subcommittee: "An
on-strategy story line that is the main plot of a half-hour show can be valued
at three 30-second ads. If there is an end tag with an 8oo number for more in-
formation at the end of a half-hour show, it is valued at an additional 15-
second ad." Id. at 14 n.2.
254. The anti-drug program as a whole, however, has been criticized for its ineffec-
tiveness. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o6-8i8, ONDCP
MEDIA CAMPAIGN: CONTRACTOR'S NATIONAL EVALUATION DID NOT FIND
THAT THE YOUTH ANTI-DRUG MEDIA CAMPAIGN WAS EFFECTIVE IN REDUC-
ING YOUTH DRUG USE (20o6), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
do68i8.pdf.
255. Not surprisingly, a GAO report on the subject conveys a different gloss, stat-
ing that one of the jobs of the program was to "work with the entertainment
and media industries to encourage the accurate depiction of the consequences
of drug use." Id. at 9.
256. More broadly, John Rawls and others have argued that bedrock principles of
ethical conduct should be capable of public dissemination without thereby
contradicting the principles themselves. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUS-
TICE 133 (1971) (advocating a "publicity condition" on moral principles); see
also Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & BER-
NARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 77, 138-39 (1973) (sug-
gesting that governments operating under secret utilitarian principles are apt
to be manipulative and coercive); Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good-
Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315, 326 (1985) (stating that, according to Rawls, "moral
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When we evaluate the merits of beneficent deception, we are presented
with difficult tradeoffs between the value of honesty and candor compared
to whatever substantive benefits the deceiver attempts to convey through
deception. Importantly, in the medical context, patients go to doctors in
order to feel better, not to develop an honest and candid relationship. Of
course, honesty and candor often facilitate effective treatment. They are not,
however, primary goals of the healthcare system.
If a prohibition on deceptive placebos can be justified, the justification
will have to appeal to more than just concerns about deception simpliciter,
because placebo deception is a very particular kind of deception. A plausible
justification for prohibiting placebo deception will likely refer to the set of
potentially harmful consequences from deceptive placebo use-including,
as I suggest, a reduction in the placebo effect from all treatments that arises
when patients suspect that they are receiving placebos. I am skeptical that it
is always unethical to administer deceptive placebos to a patient, but agnos-
tic as to whether a general prohibition might be justified by empirical evi-
dence of system-wide harms caused by placebo deception. Importantly,
however, any prohibition intended to prevent the harmful consequences
from the practice of deceptive placebo administration should be able to
identify and characterize those consequences-something that we are cur-
rently unable to do with any precision. The lack of complaining parties,
though an ambiguous signal, is some evidence that a categorical prohibition
is unwarranted, especially as research accumulates to show that placebos
have genuine therapeutic value and offer a treatment option that is unparal-
leled in its ability to reduce pain at little financial cost and with little risk of
side effects. Additional research can no doubt show how we can limit the
use of placebo deception, just as we limit the use of other scarce medical
resources, without entirely prohibiting the practice.
Therapeutic deception, indeed beneficent deception more generally,
raises challenging questions about how we ought to trade off such incom-
mensurables as honesty and pain relief, truth and comfort. When a person is
deceived for his own benefit, there is a fear that the deceiver, however well
intentioned, will value these tradeoffs differently than would the deceived he
intends to benefit. Whether this fear is well founded likely depends on the
particular setting in which the beneficent deception occurs. In the health-
care context, categorical prohibitions on beneficent deception, in an effort
to claim the moral high ground, fail to adequately recognize that beneficent
deception can, in fact, be beneficent. Indeed, if the categorical prohibition
on placebo use increases patient suffering by reducing treatment options, its
claim to the moral high ground appears increasingly deceptive.
principles are invalid if they cannot be publicly advocated without being self-
defeating").
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